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INTRODUCTION
And the more one tells of the departure from Egypt, the more is he to be
praised.'
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. Many thanks for in-
sights and advice to Marty Friedland, David Kennedy, Avraham Tsuri, Galila Turkien-
icz, and Ernie Weinrib. I am grateful to Thom Druyan for valuable research assis-
tance, and to Tsiporah Lipton for virtuosity on the keyboards. Errors, of course, are
mine alone.
1. PASSOVER HAGGADAH 9 (N. Goldberg trans. 1983) [hereinafter HAGGADAH]
The Haggadah provides the reason for the Passover celebration: "Now if God had not
brought out our forefathers from Egypt, then even we, our children, and our children's
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Theater, according to playwright/criminal Jean Genet, is "a
profound web of active symbols capable of speaking to the audience a
language in which nothing is said but everything portended." 2 One goal
of this article is to demonstrate that case law, particularly war crimes
cases, can be similarly expressive in a subliminal and suggestive way.
Stripped to their essence by an appreciation and then a peeling away of
the "social crust and discursive thought ' 3 with which they are superfi-
cially adorned, these cases are examples of what Eugene lonesco has
dubbed "theater from within"; they articulate through the medium of
law man's "most essential needs, his myths, his indisputable anguish,
his most secret reality and his dreams."'4 The point is to perceive all of
the participants in the war crimes productions - judges, lawyers, de-
fendants, witnesses, historical villains and victims - as significant not
only in their own right, but as they appear in the legal drama as
"sign[s] charged with signs."
This article examines three prominent war crimes cases: Nuremberg,
Eichmann, and Demjanjuk. These cases are analyzed as significant in-
stances in the development of both criminal and international legal doc-
trine, but more centrally, as particularly evocative moments in the to-
tality of expression aimed at the dehumanizing events of the Nazi era.'
children might still have been enslaved to Pharaoh in Egypt .... And the more one
tells of the departure from Egypt, the more is he to be praised."
2. Genet, A Note on Theatre, 7 TULANE DRAMA REV. 37, 37 (1963). Genet sug-
gests himself as potentially insightful in drawing the parallels sought to be described
here precisely because of his dual character as artist and convict. The fascination and
exploration in his plays of patterns of domination and submission, generally depicted
metaphorically in terms of complicated ceremonies and ritual, are relevant to the
drama of criminal law generally and war crimes cases in particular. See M. CARLSON,
THEORIES OF THE THEATRE 413 (1984) (comparing Genet's aesthetic and philosophical
relationship to other "absurdist" playwrights).
Another examination reinforces the theory that the law generally, and criminal pun-
ishment in particular, exists as a model of domination and subordination, through the
general juridical form. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 222 (A. Sheridan
trans. 1979) (stating that "the real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of
the formal, juridical liberties").
• 3. See E. IONEsco, NOTES AND COUNTER NOTES 224 (D. Watson trans. 1964)
(tracing this terminology from Ionesco's description of the disguises in which theatrical
expression is ordinarily cloaked; peeling away is the central goal of his "theatre de
derision"). See generally M. ESSLIN, THEATRE OF THE ABSURD (1968) (emphasizing
the raw insight that theater evokes on human nature as introduced by various authors),
4. E. IONESCO, supra note 3, at 223-24.
5. Genet, supra note 2, at 37.
6. See Kennedy, Theses About International Law Discourse, 23 GER. Y.B. INT'L
L. 353, 355 n.4 (1980) (proposing a neorealist departure from strictly logical methods
of analysis or exposition in favor of a more aesthetic approach such as the one pursued
herein); Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the
Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81, 113-15 (1975) (concluding that judicial thea-
ter is a humanizing process, the very essence of which takes place in our courtrooms),
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In this respect, the litigation and judgments are modes of dramatic en-
deavor in the sense described above; underneath the legal forms and
doctrinal language in which the cases present themselves lies a sym-
bolic message about human existence.
In each of the three cases, the message is retributory in nature. The
narration of episodes and guilt takes shape by mirroring the contradic-
tory impulses expressed in the crimes.' Thus, the conflicting pronounce-
ments evidenced in the criminal and international doctrines are linked
to the antonymous ways in which not only the defendants, but the
judges and others involved in the legal process, conceive of life.' Ulti-
mately, the entire retributory drama spins a symbolic web in which a
dual understanding of human personality is ensnared, and to which
prevalent conceptions of personhood and peoplehood can be traced.
One more point requires explanation before descending into the legal
theatrics predicated upon perhaps the most tragic night of world his-
tory.9 The presentation of war crimes cases here takes the general form
7. See infra notes 146-206 and accompanying text (describing the circumstances
and tensions evident at the trials of Nuremberg, Eichmann, and Demjanjuk).
Generally, a retributive message to criminal law is distinguishable from an instru-
mental one in that while the latter consciously seeks to produce some social change, the
former seeks to affirm some aspect of existing social life by symbolically negating the
criminal act which placed that aspect of life under attack. See infra notes 122-36 and
accompanying text (discussing retributive and instrumental displays of criminal
liability).
8. This examination of war crimes cases does not focus so much on exposing doctri-
nal contradiction as it does on probing the competing ways of portraying significant
relationships in the law. The difficult and frequently incompatible doctrinal expressions
that form the subject matter of this article are symbolically charged, reflecting a
deeper duality of the ways in which society and, finally, personality can be conceived.
This article, however, presents no theory with respect to the historical contingence or
transcendence of this understanding, or the identification of a duality. What it does
offer is a reading of transcendent themes into the contingent expressions of the case
law, but this in no way reflects a belief in the noncontingence of this reading.
In the realm of legal theory, the question of whether the conceptual contradictions
underlying the contradictions of doctrine are historically contingent has become the
subject of recent debate. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries,
28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 221 (1979) (stating that "[t]he contradiction. . . is no more
immortal than is the society that created it or sustains it"); Katz, Studies in Boundary
Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 383, 383-84
(1979) (explicating that two premises of the boundary theory, unity and duality, are
inherent to human thought).
This debate is further reducible to that between structuralism and poststructuralism
in understanding texts, myth, and social practice. See Jacobson, Translator's Preface
to C. LEVI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY xi-xv (C. Jacobson & B. Schoepf
trans. 1963) (outlining Levi-Strauss's position that one can understand kinship systems,
myths, and major political events in historical and ahistorical terms); M. FOUCAULT,
supra note 2, at 222-23 (deducing that "deep meaning" identified as transcending cul-
tural constructs is also itself a cultural construct).
9. The image of "night" has been employed with reference to the historic events
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of an allegory, with each case introduced and ultimately explained by
reference to some aspect of the Haggadah, or narrative read at the
Passover meal. The story and rabbinic commentaries on the exodus
from slavery in Egypt suggests itself as relevant for a number of rea-
sons, particularly the celebration of freedom embodied in the ritualized
retelling of the tribulations of history. War crimes cases, in their guise
as repetitive and formalized dramatic histories, share much of this es-
sence. In periodically retelling these horror stories, we not only educate
ourselves with respect to history and the extremes of human nature,10
but vindicate the freedom that lies in our various conceptions of
ourselves.
I. Nuremberg: "Why is this night different . .. ?"
It does not seem an exaggeration to say that nowhere in any legal
system has a judicial panel articulated an abhorrence of evil quite so
dramatically as did the postwar judges sitting at Nuremberg - per-
haps because no judicial body has ever before or since been confronted
with quite the magnitude of evil as that cumulatively embodied by the
particular Nuremberg defendants. Yet, for all its stirring invocations of
the "law of nations" and its evocative condemnations of "crimes
against humanity," the Nuremberg case remains somewhat difficult to
understand. In the aftermath of the world's (and certainly Germany's)
most devastating war, what exactly did the conviction and execution of
several more Nazis accomplish that had not already been done? Fur-
thermore, was the trial, for all of its formalist theatrics, an assertion of
principle over coercive force, or was it merely one more exercise of co-
ercive power capping a decade of unparalleled violence? After all, the
assertion of judgmental authority by the Allied powers over the individ-
ual leaders of Germany's Third Reich seemed anticlimatic following
the massive punishment accompanying the liberation of Europe, and
superfluously vengeful given the total defeat of Germany's wartime re-
gime and the acknowledged impossibility of its immediate or future
now known to the world as the Holocaust on numerous occasions, although perhaps
never more poignantly than in Elie Weisel's own intensely personal account of the Nazi
era, the destruction of his family, and the world they came from. E. WEISEL, NIGHT
(S. Rodway trans. 1960).
10. The annual reading of the Haggadah also is said to go beyond a mere educative
function. See HAGGADAH, supra note 1, at 9 ("[e]ven were we all wise, all men of
understanding, and even if we were all old and well learned in the Torah, it would still
be our duty to tell the story of the departure from Egypt").
11. See HAGGADAH, supra note 1, at 8 (presenting the first of the questions to
which the rest of the Haggadah narrative provides the answer: "Why is this night




Comprehension of the Nuremberg decision becomes possible only
with an initial change in the focus of the inquiry. The question is not
what the case accomplished because in the usual instrumental terms it
accomplished next to nothing. Accordingly, the first glimmer of under-
standing comes only with an acceptance of Nuremberg's instrumental
irrelevance and a further probing into those features of the case that
suggest the proceedings represented something other than just another
instance of arbitrary or self-righteous violence by nations against per-
sons over whom they should have no say. The question in uncovering
and appreciating the dramatic core of Nuremberg is: what message
about transnational and national illegality and legal structures, or
about human self-conceptions and human behavior, did the judgment
evoke?
In attempting to approach the fundamental message of the Nurem-
berg case, one must simultaneously pursue two distinct lines of inquiry.
One must come to grips with the nature of the legal authority asserted
in the case and somehow reconcile the questions of judicial process that
accompany this adjudication with the substantive notions of culpability
that the judgment propounds. To accomplish this task, however, an in-
quiry into the general nature and project of retributory justice must
supplement an analysis of the international and criminal process case
law from which the Nuremberg case emerges. Ultimately, the judg-
ment pronounced and punishment inflicted at Nuremberg takes on the
classic retributive posture of mirroring the condemned acts for the sole
purpose of articulating and dramatically enacting a symbolic state-
ment. Thus, only when one gets to the heart of this symbolism, and
interweaves the message about human self-definitions with the ideas of
legal authority and criminal culpability embedded in the case, can one
finally appreciate the Nuremberg dramatics.
A. THE RETRIBUTORY MESSAGE
Contrary to common perceptions, the primary message of retribution
entails an affirmative rather than a negative statement.1 2 In both a
12. The negativity generally associated with retribution as a basis for justice was
perhaps most dramatically asserted by Beccaria. See C. BECCARIA, ON CFaEs AND
PUNISHMENTs 42 (Ist ed. 1983) (querying, "[c]an the groans of a tortured wretch re-
call the time past, or reverse the crime he has committed?").
For an overview of the philosophical literature dealing with retributive justice, see
Brudner, Retributivism and the Death Penalty, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 337, 345-54
(1980) (vindicating retributivism as the only morally defensible ground for punishment
and relating its implications to capital punishment).
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philosophical and an aesthetic sense, it is not so much the condemna-
tion of the impugned act that gives the retributive theme its dramatic
impact; rather, it is the assertion and vindication of that which the con-
demned act denied. Thus, although retribution as a basis for punish-
ment ignores forward-looking goals of criminal justice such as deter-
rence and rehabilitation,1 3 cases expressing such a message do not tend
merely to seek an historically oriented vengeance for the past acts. 4
The undeniably evocative quality of any decision in which retribution
plays a major thematic part can be traced to the affirmation of exis-
tence for which the case invariably stands. Ultimately, this exercise in
mirroring offensive acts for no purpose other than its own symbolic
message, can be seen as an elaboration upon those qualities that make
all people - the victims, the defendants, and the population that the
judicial body represents - free from the oppression that the unvan-
quished criminality would otherwise reflect. This basic celebration of
the freedom that potentially inheres to human personality constitutes
the affirmative retributionary message and links the symbolic content
of the judgment in these cases to the notion that "the most radical
freedom is the freedom to be." ' While judicial theatrics can be, and
often are, utilized for any number of transitive goals or instrumental
purposes,16 retributive justice concentrates on the most dramatic crimes
not to bring about a specific empirical change, but in an effort to ex-
press those eternal aspects of personality that account for everyone's
13. See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
406-11 (1958) (positing principles of rehabilitation and deterrence as positive instru-
mental functions and two driving forces of criminal law, yet finding them generally
distinguishable from retributive goals); see also Fletcher, The Right Deed for the
Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REv. 293, 302-04 (1975)
(comparing the instrumentalist theory with the legalist theory, while discussing the
goals of criminal punishment).
For a more classical assertion of the instrumentalist view, see J. BENTHAM, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 172-75 (1970) (ex-
plaining why punishment is unjustified in circumstances where it would be
"inefficacious").
14. See Weinrib, Enduring Passion, 94 YALE L.J. 1825, 1839 n.43 (1985) (citing
I. KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW §§ 80, 83 (M. Gregor
trans. Ist ed. 1798), and S. SHELL, THE RIGHTS OF REASON: A STUDY OF KANT'S
PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 122 (1980)). Kant postulated that revenge is tangentially
related to law because it contemplates a notion of right and wrong for the avenger.
However, it is distinct from retribution as discussed here in that its personalization of
punishment constrains its message to the particular context of the offense, making any
symbolic affirmation beyond the avenger's own satisfaction impossible. Weinrib, supra,
at 1839.
15. R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 107 (1984).
16. See infra notes 122-36 and accompanying text (discussing judicial instrumen-
talism of criminal liability).
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capacity to be "a unique person in the world as it is."17
In order to come to grips with the retributive message, therefore, one
must first comprehend in an abstract sense the various ways in which
freedom from oppression is conceived. This, in turn, requires at least
some understanding of the human self-conceptions exhibited in the case
law, which necessitates an inquiry into those attributes that character-
ize human endeavor and provide a deep structure to the portraits of
freedom that the case law provides. For present purposes, these aspects
of personality can be grouped into broad categories: rational thought
and emotional bonds.1
8
The first of these attributes to be examined, after introducing the
Nuremburg tribunal's jurisdictional dilemmas, is human rationality,
which lies at the core of the judicial portrayal of freedom in the person-
alized, noncontextual form that G.W.F. Hegel has labeled "abstract
right."19 The second of these attributes examined is human emotion,
that lies at the core of the judicial portrayal of personal liberation in
the socially bonded, contextualized form that Roberto Unger has re-
ferred to as the "life of the passions." Although neither vision of per-
sonality is on its own entirely explicative, a combination of the two
opposing concepts lies at the substantive core of the complex assertions
of judicial process over individuals and nations that international law
and domestic criminal law exhibit. Ultimately, the assertion of legal
authority by a given judicial body, particularly when the essence of the
adjudication is the enunciation of retributive symbolism rather than the
instigation of immediate social change, constitutes an evocation of
those particular configurations of human personality. The court per-
ceives the evocation as a characterized version of interactive social life
presented by the stories of the prosecution and the defendant in the
case.
17. R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 107-08.
18. To echo the introductory remarks by Roberto Unger in his work on the impli-
cations of a life dominated by human passions, this article attempts to pursue an analy-
sis of war crimes case law as an exercise in the "practice of attributing normative force
to conceptions of personality." R. UNGER, supra note 15, at vii (noting that the book
presents methodological and substantive concerns).
The dualistic conception presented herein flows from Rousseau's insight that al-
though rationality and passion seem to represent contradictory impulses, they in fact
coexist in symbiotic balance. See J. Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 188-89 (L. Crocker d.
1974) (stating that "the human understanding is greatly indebted to the passions,
which, on their side, are likewise universally allowed to be greatly indebted to the
human understanding").
19. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 37-74 (T. Knox trans. 1952) [hereinafter
HEGEL].
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B. THE TRIBUNAL'S PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY
As indicated, the symbolic message with respect to human self-iden-
tity is articulated in conjunction with the novel structuring of legal au-
thority that the Nuremberg case implied. The novelty did not exist on
the plane of substantive criminal law. That is, it had become apparent
by the time of the liberation of Nazi-occupied Europe that the persons
comprising the upper echelons of the Third Reich deserved criminal
punishment. The sheer extent of Germany's official depravity served to
render any definitional questions with respect to criminality beyond the
scope of sane debate.2 0 Although such substantive issues as the "de-
fense of superior orders" and the retroactivity of "crimes against hu-
manity" were, and remain, the subject of some legal and scholarly con-
cern,2 the interesting problems posed by the Nuremberg Charter22 and
tribunal were essentially those of legal process rather than substance.
On what basis could an adjudicative body created by non-German state
entities assert judgmental authority over the former leaders of the Ger-
man nation? Given that Goring, von Ribbentrop, Borman, Hess, and
others23 were guilty of any number of substantively offensive acts, by
20. Several instances in postwar legal discourse have tangentially generated debate
over the nature of the Nazi regime. In one case, holocaust apologists and neo-Nazi
enthusiasts have asserted a right of free speech. See Collins v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197,
1210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (holding that a demonstration by
American Nazi Party members is protected by the first amendment). In another case,
actions were brought against revisionist historians and holocaust deniers. See Regina v.
Zundel, 35 D.L.R.4th 338, 338-43, 352-55 (Ont. C.A. 1987) (allowing prosecution for
spreading false and vindictive news under the hate literature provisions of the Canadian
Criminal Code). Nevertheless, the substantive question of Nazi criminality has not
been deemed subject matter worthy of mainstream legal, ethical, or political debate.
21. See Y. DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF 'OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS' IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 127-59 (1965) (referring to the discussion of obedience to superior
orders presented in the Nuremberg trial); R. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-19 (1960) (rationalizing the Tribunal's distinction between
retroactivity and superior orders); Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 38, 59-62 (1947) (reiterating the court's refusal to address crimes against
humanity occurring prior to the outbreak of the war); Goodhart, The Legality of the
Nuremberg Trials, 58 JURID. REV. 1, 6-8 (1946) (commenting on the ex post facto
character of the Nuremberg prosecution).
22. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, reprinted in 1 TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 10 (1947)
[hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. The Nuremberg Charter is annexed to the Agree-
ment for Establishment of an International Military Tribunal, signed by the govern-
ments of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Agree-
ment for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 582 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in
Official Document Supplement, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1945).
23. Twenty-two individuals were indicted in the Nuremberg case, including: Gor-
ing, von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Streicher, Bormann (in absentia), Hess, Kaltenbrunner,
Rosenberg, Frank, Frick, Funk, Schacht, Donitz, Raeder, Von Schirach, Sauckel, Jodl,
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what power could punishment be inflicted and ultimate retribution be
had?
A close reading of the Judgment of the Nuremberg International
Military TribunaP4 reveals several alternative footings on which the
tribunal purportedly asserted criminal jurisdiction. In the first place,
the Nuremberg Charter was perceived as an "exercise of the sovereign
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich uncondi-
tionally surrendered."25 The connotation suggests that although the
Charter was drafted and judges appointed by agreement among the
four occupying powers, the tribunal itself was constituted as essentially
a domestic German court. In this view the Allies, as conquerors, simply
stood in the shoes of German sovereignty, so that with the demise of
indigenous authority at the end of the war, the four-power administra-
tion was left to bring offenders to justice under any past or present
German regime. Far from the innovative embodiment of international
legality that the Nuremberg tribunal is generally thought to represent,
this first jurisdictional assertion stands merely as a peculiar expression
of postwar Germany's inherent right or power to try wartime German
criminals.
Regardless of a certain logical appeal to this approach, conforming
as it does to traditional assertions of criminal jurisdiction, this domesti-
cated concept of war crimes adjudication is more of a disguise than an
expression of the total Nuremberg message. Although the reluctance of
the Allies to appear to be engaging in a victor's exercise in punishing
the vanquished may well account for a traditional rhetorical shield, the
postwar trials clearly enunciate a vision of legal authority going beyond
the idea of the German nation's own judgment of its past leaders' do-
mestic offenses. Indeed, if such were not the case, the judgment would
represent just one more instance, albeit an historically odd one, of uni-
lateral state power over domestic crime.26 In addition, although such a
von Papen, Seyss-Inquart, Speer, Von Neurath, and Fritzsche. See Judicial Decisions,
41 AM. J. INTL L. 172, 333 (1947) (specifying the counts on which each defendant
was convicted and the sentence that each received).
24. Id. at 172-333. Edited and excerpted versions of the judgment appear in nu-
merous international law casebooks. See D. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 555 (1983) [providing the version of the case hereinafter referred to as
Nuremberg in HARRIS]; L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. S IT, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 907 (giving a synopsis of the case) (1980).
25. Nuremberg in HARRIS, supra note 24, at 556.
26. The capacity of a sovereign state to exercise criminal law and other powers over
subject matters within its territorial bounds, without reference to any extrinsic author-
ity, is so deeply entrenched in the legal consciousness as to rarely surface in the form of
discussion or debate. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
136 (1812) (stating: "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessa-
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judgment would technically take the form of a sovereign exercise of
domestic adjudicative authority, its content would not have emanated
from within, but rather would have been imposed from outside of the
domestic German legal system.27 Accordingly, any symbolic portence
of a newly conceived freedom would give way to an understanding of
the case in only the crudest of vengeful or instrumental terms - an
unlikely conception of a judgment by the powers that had recently sub-
jected the defendants and their nation to a devastating defeat at war.
Having stated the possibility of its existence as a domestic criminal
court, the tribunal in its next sentence responded to the inevitable skep-
ticism and revealed its second, and somewhat less defensive, ground of
jurisdiction. "The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the
part of the victorious Nations," the judgment asserts, "but . . .is the
expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; and
to that extent is itself a contribution to international law."28 The sub-
stantive picture, as expressed through the doctrinal medium of interna-
tional jurisdiction, is emphatically different from that contained in the
first (domestic) statement of the tribunal's adjudicative authority. Here
the individual defendants are envisioned not so much as having com-
mitted crimes against some embodiment of the German state, but
rather as having acted offensively against the normative environment of
the entire world.
This internationalization of the judicial process embodies the dra-
matic and historically novel message generally associated with the Nu-
remberg case. It is also this universalist theme, however, that imports
the most difficult doctrinal wrinkles and conceptual hurdles that the
case posed. As will be seen, the notion of individual responsibility in a
transovereign setting was not readily compatible with the rhetorical
framework within which international law traditionally operated. 20 In
rily exclusive and absolute . . . .It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by it-
self"); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 103 (1962), 10 U.L.A. 452 (1962) (declaring
territorial applicability).
27. Although application of nondomestic norms by domestic courts is considered
perfectly acceptable in such fields as contracts, torts, family law, and others, where it
constitutes the central doctrinal focus of the body of rules existing under the rubric of
conflicts of laws, the application of nondomestic criminal law is generally considered
unacceptably close to an undermining of one state's sovereignty by the exercise of an-
other's sovereign powers. See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929)
(Hand, J., concurring) (declaring it impermissible for a criminal court "[t]o pass upon
the provisions for the public order of another state.").
28. Nuremberg in HARRIS, supra note 24, at 556.
29. There are numerous pronouncements to this effect in pre-World War II inter-
national case law. Even those cases that ultimately enforce some international legal
rule in favor of an individual involved in an interstate conflict do so in a way that either
denies the separateness of the individual's identity from that of the parent sovereign, or
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fact, it was equally at odds with the traditional domestic law formula-
tions of extranational or extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.
The very notion that other (i.e., non-German) sovereignties, or the
international system itself, could somehow judge the admittedly offen-
sive acts that Germans committed within their country appeared on its
face to be intrinsically jarring to any pre-Nuremberg legal structure.30
No preconceived version of normative authority fit the Nazi facts, or
could be said to inform what the formal structure of the Nuremberg
case suggested: the judgment of individuals by representatives of other
nations. Thus, to fully appreciate the tribunal's ultimate statement of
its own authority, and, in particular, in order to comprehend the vindi-
cation and symbolic identity that this highly visible instance of retribu-
tion is meant to serve, the theoretical bases of the various international
and domestic pronouncements on the jurisdictional bounds of legal pro-
cess must be explored in turn. The question becomes: is the case as
appropriately different in its staging and message, its form and content,
as was the "night," in the Wiesel sense of the word, from all other
"nights?"
C. RATIONALITY AND PERSONHOOD
As indicated, comprehension of the message lying at the core of war
crimes adjudications requires some preliminary consideration of several
philosophical positions on personality that the case law combines and
evokes. The first conception of human identity embodied by retributory
that domesticates the legal question by dissociating the individual from the sovereign
state embroiled in the international controversy. Compare The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 388, 394-95 (1815) (inferring that ownership of the enemy national's property
seized on a neutral ship turns on the friend or foe character of the goods) with The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 689-91 (1900) (recanting that an individual's owner-
ship of a ship flying a belligerent flag depends on the separation of coastal fishermen
from the national war effort of their country). See generally Morgan, Internalization
of Customary International Law: An Historical Perspective, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 63,
63-65 (1987) (discussing various rhetorical devices used in The Nereide and The Pa-
quete Habana cases).
30. Not only were sovereign states perceived as the primary juridical personalities
of international law and the primary source of all legal authority whether domestic or
national, but entities lacking in one or more of the essential attributes of statehood
were considered to be nonentities in the international legal sense of being nonbearers of
rights and obligations vis-a-vis other sovereign entities. Compare Convention on Rights
and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19
(providing qualifications of states as international legal persons) with Report of the
International Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations
with the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland
Islands Question, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 3 (1920) (finding that
statehood constituted only if domestic authorities no longer depended on foreign mili-
tary presence).
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expression is that of abstract individuality. This conception is traced by
its most forceful philosophic champions to the distinctly human capac-
ity for rational endeavor. Although the link between moral personality
and reason is generally associated with the philosophy of Immanuel
Kant,3 ' it is in Hegel's further elaborations that the human capacity for
detachment from external contexts into a pure abstraction of thought
finds its ultimate expression as a source of freedom. Hegel begins his
analytic endeavor by indicating that the nature of mankind, distin-
guished from that of other beasts, is defined by the thinking will. Un-
like an animal whose actions represent a manifestation of instinct or
"inner impulse," an individual holds before her mind the object of her
desire, so that the actions that she takes, or those that she wills, are
desires determined by the process of thought. In this view, one does not
act against the external world by giving expression to unfettered desire
or arbitrary will, but rather one understands the externalities and
makes them part of one's own thought process.3 2
This characterization of persons as inherently capable of standing
over the objects of their desires by thinking, rather than allowing such
objects to dominate them through uncontrolled impulse,3 gives rise to
Hegel's next proposition that freedom is integral to the thinking will.
By definition, the will is said to dissipate "every restriction and every
content either immediately presented by nature, by needs, desires, and
impulses, or given and determined by any means whatever. ' ' 34 Will, in
this view, is intrinsically wed to thought; therefore, the possibility exists
for unrestricted abstraction from various impulsive inclinations as well
as from any particular state of mind that a person might find in
herself."
If the will is defined as the aspect of human nature that cannot be
restricted or the process that underlies the self-determination of inner
31. See I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 12-13 (J. Ladd trans.
1965) (discussing the Kantian inspiration in which the capacity for reasoned action is
identified as the starting point for an analysis of right).
32. See HEGEL, supra note 19, at 226 (explaining the freedom of will by referring
to the physical law). In Hegel's own inimitable words: "The variegated canvas of the
world is before me; I stand over against it; by my theoretical attitude to it I overcome
its opposition to me and make its content my own." Id.
33. Kant makes a similar point by describing the human will as divided into two
distinct processes; one generates desire, the other determines this desire into action. I.
KANT, supra note 31, at 12. This inevitable two-step functioning of the will is put
forward as an explanation of the fact that unlike animals, whose impulses are trans-
lated directly into actions without being filtered through the process of reason, persons
can be enslaved neither by their own desires nor by the objects on which such desires
may center. Id. at 13.
34. HEGEL, supra note 19, at 21.
35. Id. at 22.
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impulse into action, so that active externalizations cannot be dictated
by forces which bypass rational thought, it follows for Hegel that
"[f]reedom ... is just as fundamental a character of the will as
weight is of bodies." 36 This internal or subjective freedom of the will,
therefore, is the first identifiable characteristic of personhood that af-
fects on behavior. The possessor of a thinking will so defined can never
claim that her actions represent a manifestation of forces beyond
control.
The free will establishes the nature of personality; therefore, every
person must be equal in his natural freedom to determine himself
through thought.37 Thus, human freedom necessarily goes beyond the
subjective sense of the capacity to surmount internal animalistic desires
and is objectified by the notion of equality so that it extends to freedom
from the unbridled desires of others.-" As a result, the subjective free-
dom which inheres to personality translates neatly into an objective
freedom from the impingements of others. Moreover, the structure of
freedom that this view of personality implies is crucial to all social or-
ganization and, further, is expressed in "positivized" form as the de-
lineation in practical terms of the scope of each individual's freedom."'
This rationality implicit in any human act, and the inherently equal
capacity of all persons to engage in a similarly rational process, allows
any given external manifestation of will to be imputed with an abstract
statement spoken in the reflective voice. Thus, an element of universal-
ity and self-submission to the reflective processes of the will prohibits
the domination of any one thinking will over another.4 While respect
for personhood demands that each and every act implicitly convey that
the actor is rationally cognizant of her existence among others with
whom she shares equal personal freedoms, the egoistic impulse of self-
36. Id. at 226.
37. In Kant's terms every human action is, because of this fundamental equality of
wills, "susceptible to imputation," i.e., readable as a universally applicable statement. I.
KANT, supra note 3 1, at 24.
38. This sense of equality, however, is of a special, abstract type. In Hegel's terms:
"[w]hen I say 'I', I eo ipso abandon all my particular characteristics, my disposition,
natural endowment, knowledge, and age. The ego is quite empty, a mere point, simple,
yet active in this simplicity." HEGEL, supra note 19, at 226.
Whatever else may exist to differentiate the possessions, character, and socialization
of individuals, they are all, at the very minimum, equal in the definition of their essen-
tial rational nature.
39. Hegel states that "[t]he will is free, so that freedom is both the substance of
right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm of freedom made actual, the
world of mind brought forth out of itself like a second nature." HEGEL, supra note 19,
at 20.
40. See supra note 37, at 13 (providing the Kantian explanation of this
imputation).
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assertion or self-preference is the mark of human disrespect.41
From the philosophical perspective that holds rationality as central
to personhood, an external manifestation of thought that denies "ab-
stract right" is an offense against human nature,"' in that it expresses a
coercive show of unbridled will, and is a nullity in terms of interper-
sonal relations. In denying the system of "positivized" freedom or right,
it effectively denies its own scope of action. "The manifestation of its
nullity," Hegel writes, "is the appearance, also in the external world of
the annihilation of the infringement. ' 3 Thus, egoistic or oppressive co-
ercion is self-destructive because it asserts a claim not only to subsume
another free will under it, but if universalized and turned against the
actor, it will equally annul her own individual freedom." The offender,
therefore, not only allows himself to be coerced, but demands a recipro-
cal coercion if the inhuman assertion implicit in his actions is treated
with the human respect it nevertheless deserves. Just as rationality is
the essence of personhood, it is this logical reciprocity of aggression
against the offender that, for Hegel, lies at the heart of retribution.
D. INDIVIDUALS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Nuremberg case is a striking invocation of individual responsi-
bility and vindication of abstract personhood in one sense, and an odd
deviation from standard international legal process in another sense. In
singling out the particular Nazi leaders and mirroring their offensive
acts through the expression of culpability and infliction of punishment,
the tribunal reenacted the deprivation of individual personality in a
way that dramatically accentuated its rational essence. Yet, the struc-
ture of the theater, or the setting of the stage, seemed unfamiliar at
best and incongruous at worst. The judging of individuals by foreign
nations seemed so alien to international process that the substantive
message threatened to lose itself in the interminability of the jurisdic-
41. To again invoke a Kantian explanation, an act manifesting an assertion of
structural inequality between the actor and another is perceived by Kant as a self-
preference in conception, and as such is an irrational determination of the will. 1.
KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41-42 (L. Beck trans. 1959).
This, of course, is also the fundamental message of the renowned categorical impera-
tive: "[A]ct according to a maxim that can at the same time be valid as a universal
law." 1. KANT, supra note 31, at 26.
42. Note Hegel's assertion that "It]he infringement of right as right is something
that happens and has positive existence in the external world." HEGEL, supra note 19,
at 69. Just as the infringement has a positive existence, so must the right. In this way,
the naturalist exercise of tracing freedom to personality takes on the form of positive
law.
43. Id.




Accordingly, this article delves briefly into the background of inter-
national legal process, and in particular examines the traditional rela-
tionships between persons and nations embodied in this field of legal
endeavor, before comprehending the similarities and changes in both
process and substance that the Nuremberg decision in the end ex-
pressed. In effect, one must appreciate the struggle of self-definition
encompassed by classical international law to appreciate the scope of
the soul-searching articulated by the postwar tribunal.
It is trite, if not entirely accurate, to say that individuals found no
place within the thought structure of classical international law 5 In-
deed, some of the earliest of the modern attempts to formulate a notion
of transnational rather than national legal order have at their core a
conception of the natural sovereignty of persons rather than the (in this
view) artificial groupings represented by polities or states." Foremost
among such thinkers was Hugo Grotius, whose vision of the universal
sociability of human beings47 and whose rejection of coercive state au-
thority in favor of a transcendent and just social life demanded by the
45. The triteness comes from the fact that, as discussed above, individuals rarely
found a place in the rhetorical structure of classical international discourse. The inac-
curacy, however, comes from the correlative fact that, as noted supra note 29, the
factoring of individuals out of international legal rhetoric often indicated that individu-
als had a significant place in the thought structure of international legality, but that for
one reason or another the rhetorical devices of the discipline were not equipped to ex-
plicitly recognize the fact. See generally Kennedy, supra note 6 (discussing the opera-
tion of international legal rhetoric).
46. Debate over the legal recognition of human beings in their dual capacities as
sovereign individuals and as members of a polity may be said to trace at least from
Aristotle's identification of two irreducibly distinct forms of justice: corrective and dis-
tributive. ARISTOTLE, V Nicomachean Ethics 1129b-1 132b, in THE WORKS OF ARIs-
TOTLE 377-80 (W. Ross trans. 1952) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE]; see Weinrib, Toward a
Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL 37 (1983) (identifying corrective
justice as appropriate to the algebraic structure of adjudication, and distributive justice
as appropriate to the geometric relationships of regulation and welfare law). In contem-
porary international legal and scholarly debate, this dichotomy has revolved around
competing conceptions of the primacy of personal rights protection and international
order among political bodies. See D'Amato, Nicaragua and International Law: The
'Academic' and the 'Real', 79 ANt. J. INT'L L. 657, 659-60 (1985) (noting that the law
of human rights existed before the United Nations Charter and continues to exist re-
gardless of current notions of state sovereignty); McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS
(M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1981) (discussing world public order as a meta-
norm of international law). For a theoretical account of this international debate, see
Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International Covenants on Human Rights: A
Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219 (1985) (contrasting universalized
human rights with political will).
47. H. GROTIuS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 11 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925); see
also Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 79 (discussing
Grotius's natural law view derived from the drive toward sociability).
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law of human nature48 is identified as a conceptual starting point for
the modern search for universal legal order.4
Ironically, the natural law flavor of this early approach to interna-
tional legality and its own evident sources in such nonsecular (and
nonpositivist) bodies of thought as those of Aquinas 50 and Augustine,"
have led to the ultimate rejection of human individuality as both the
point of departure for transnational juridical existence and the explicit
premise for nineteenth and twentieth century international jurists. One
can articulate contemporary (and certainly pre-World War II) interna-
tional doctrinal pronouncements in such a way that the backlash of
nineteenth century positivism, and the skeptical attack on the very no-
tion of extrasovereign norms spearheaded by John Austin,5 have the
most profound and lasting impact. For the most part, the bite of Aus-
tinian positivism and the lawyer's general discomfort with a system
void of any hierarchical structure or source of normative authority 3
48. H. GROTIUS, supra note 47, at 587 (stating that individuals "should altogether
refrain from [warfare] if it is clear to them that the case of the war is unjust"); see
Kahn, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v.
United States and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 47-53
(1987) (discussing the "just war" theories propounded at the dawn of modern interna-
tional discourse).
49. See Kahn, supra note 48, at 48 n.171 (stating that "Grotius is the key link
between the premodern, religious perspective on international legal obligations and the
modern international legal concern with human rights"); Kennedy, supra note 47, at
77 (noting that Grotius secularized "the primitive vision of a worldwide normative
order").
50. See THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 113 (D. Bigongiari ed.
1969) (providing Aquinas's restatement of Aristotle's categories of natural justice in
his consideration of "what is justice?").
51. See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 112 (M. Dods trans. 1950) (reiterating
Augustine's renowned statement of natural justice: "justice being taken away, then,
what are kingdoms but great robberies?").
52. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 201 (1954)
(noting the classical assertion of this attack on the notion of international legality).
Austin states, "[H]ence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is
not positive law: for every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons
in a state of subjection to its author . . . . [T]he law obtaining between nations is law
(improperly so called) . . . ." Id.
53. As is evident, the impact of positivist thinking has in this respect gone well
beyond the international law context discussed here. In a general way, legal formalism
readily conforms to Austin's pronouncement that "[laws properly so called are a spe-
cies of commands." Id. at 133. The conceptual comfort of the legal consciousness
within a positively manifested normative hierarchy is illustrated by cases in which there
is seen a judicial disregard for ethical imperatives over the requirements of the (ethi-
cally arbitrary) sovereign or legislative will. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393, 452 (1857) (holding the prohibition on slavery in federal territory un-
constitutional); United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969) (af-
firming the conviction of conscientious war protesters). Perhaps the most stark illustra-
tions of an Austinian approach to legal positivism are instances in which courts are
faced with the legal effect of the acts of a regime that has rebelled against the continu-
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has engendered not only a great deal of sophisticated and defensive
posturing by international jurists, but has prompted an elaborate at-
tempt to build the positivists' crucial concept of sovereignty back into
the very structure of trans-sovereign law.
The recreated positivism of international legal theory has taken the
particular form of imbuing interstate norms of conduct with an
equivalent type of formal, objectively discernable validity as that which
denotes the unquestionably positive existence of domestic enactments.
In the words of the champion of this brand of post-Austinian positiv-
ism, Hans Kelsen: "[I]nternational law is regarded as [a] . . . set of
objectively valid norms that regulate the mutual behavior of states...
[and] are created by custom, constituted by the actual behavior of the
'states.' "54 In the Kelsenian view, the binding force of international
legality, much like the edicts and commands of a domestic sovereign,
finds its source in the externalized evidence of formal validity.ce This
apparently valid form, in turn, allows for the assertion by the legal the-
orist that "a basic norm is presupposed that establishes custom among
states as a law-creating fact."56 Much like the domestic enactment or
decree that issues from the embodiment of sovereignty in valid form -
the authority of which is presupposed by virtue of this very formal va-
lidity57 -actual participation of sovereign states in acts identified as
ation of the constitutional authority of the preexisting sovereign. See, e.g., Horn v.
Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570, 580-81 (1873) (validating Confederate acts neces-
sary to the preservation of the "bonds of society," but rejecting the insurrectionary acts
of southern states against the rightful authority of the United States); Madzimbamuto
v. Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 App. Cas. 645, 723-31 (P.C.) (rejecting de facto or de jure
recognition of acts of the post-U.D.I. Rhodesian regime).
54. H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 215 (1967).
55. The positivist focus on the "external" criteria of legal form rather than the
"internal" criteria of content underlies the usual distinction drawn by common law
judges between the realms of law and ethics. Thus, ethical codes of various sorts are
conceived as properly serving the wholly internalized phenomena of thought and
desires. See Matthew 5:28 (stating that "whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after
her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart"). By contrast, "the aim of
the law," according to Justice Holmes, "is not to punish sins," but to prevent "certain
external results." Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 20, 48 N.E. 770, 777
(1897).
56. H. KELSEN, supra note 54, at 215-16.
57. Kelsen states that the presupposition of authority flowing from a formally valid
act constitutes the grundnorm (basic norm) of all legality:
For the historically first constitution such an interpretation [premised solely on
validity] is possible only if we presuppose that one ought to. . . perform coer-
cive acts only under the conditions and in the manner the constitution stipulates;
if, in other words, we presuppose a norm according to which (a) the act whose
meaning is to be interpreted as 'constitutional' is to be regarded as establishing
objectively valid norms, and (b) the individuals who establish this act as the
constitution[al] authorities. . . . This presupposition is the ultimate. . . reason
for the validity of the legal order.
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constituting customary law in effect establishes the validity, and the
presupposition of binding authority, of such law. As Kelsen puts it:
"'Coercion of state against state ought to . . . conform with the cus-
tom constituted by the actual behavior of the states.' That is the 'con-
stitution' of international law in a transcendental-logical sense. ""8
Notwithstanding these conceptual twists and turns operating in the
realm of theory about international law, international legal discourse
itself has remained remarkably unreflective about its own theoretical
premises. Thus, the result of the dominance of Kelsenian positivism has
been a rather simple, though effective, move to structure the doctrinal
pronouncements in such a way as to trace the source of any particular
international legal norm to the consent of the relevant sovereigns. The
two primary forms that such norms take - treaty provisions and cus-
tomary rules - are each said to flow either directly (in the case of
treaties) or indirectly (in the case of custom) from some voluntary sov-
ereign action. The effect of this international legal structure has been
twofold. First, individuals have of necessity been factored out of the
discourse, there being no place in a system of consenting sovereigns for
any such quintessentially nonstate entities. Second, the identification of
law in the manifestations of actual state practice and consent has be-
come something of a rhetorical sleight of hand; the international legal
system is thereby attributed with its capacity to pronounce restraints
on state action while all the time seeming to accentuate rather than to
limit the ultimate authority of sovereign states.
It is essential to explore more concretely the paradoxical manner in
which international judicial pronouncements trace any hint of a sys-
temic power of restraint to the unrestrained power of sovereigns to con-
fer or withhold their consent. In so doing, a deeper comprehension
might be achieved of the uncomfortable way in which the Nuremberg
suggestion of individual responsibility sits in the state-oriented world of
transnational legality. The most promising place to start is with the
1927 decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
in The S.S. Lotus.5" This decision, which contains perhaps the most
renowned discussion of the essentially consensual nature of sources doc-
trine in all of international law, ° goes a long way toward exemplifying
Id. at 46-47.
58. Id. at 215.
59. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
60. It has become quite commonplace for discussions of the sources of international
law to point to either the direct or the indirect consent of sovereigns. See, e.g., Reserva-
tions to the Genocide Convention Case, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 32 (May 28) (Guerrero, Mc-
Nair, Read, and Hsu Mo, JJ., dissenting) (stating: "the legal basis of ... conventions,
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the doctrinal constructs in which the predominant visions of legal
sources and, indeed, statehood itself get expressed in traditional inter-
national discourse.
The case centered on the question of criminal jurisdiction in interna-
tional law and would, therefore, seem immediately pertinent to the Nu-
remberg decision. The precise question faced by the court in Lotus,
however, was that of the existence of any restraints on the unilateral
assertion by a sovereign state of jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts,
and so the court did not directly touch on any debate over the interna-
tional system's own criminal process or jurisdictional presence. Indeed,
the court responded to France's claim that Turkish criminal jurisdic-
tion over acts aboard a French ship amounted to a violation of sover-
eignty by emphasizing its own passivity in the creative processes of in-
ternational law making.6" Thus, the decision distinctly illustrates the
way in which international tribunals attempt to impose normative lim-
its on sovereign states without deviating from their comfortably defen-
sive posture of protecting and reaffirming the very concept of unre-
strained sovereignty. In this respect, the Lotus decision reflects the
discursive posture that international legality has traditionally assumed;
it articulates extrasovereign or systemic norms in a system with neither
an overarching sovereignty of its own nor an ability to penetrate its
sovereign participants and gaze directly at the wrongs and rights of
their individual constituents.
The question of criminal jurisdiction addressed by the PCIJ, there-
fore, is one step removed from the ordinary issues of process that come
before the criminal courts. Despite the obvious concern with the de-
fendant's culpability, the Lotus decision seems to naturally shift its fo-
cus from the relationship between Captain Demian and the Turkish
court to that between Turkey and France. Turkey's "victims' jurisdic-
tion" is never discussed within its own frame of reference as a delinea-
tion of responsibility to the national community for which the Turkish
courts stand. Neither, however, is it seen as a norm that transcends
and the essential thing that brings them into force, is the common consent of the par-
ties"); Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (stating that
international customary obligations are based upon a "constant and uniform usage,
accepted as law").
61. Captain Demians, the skipper of a French ship, the S.S. Lotus, was brought
before the Turkish courts and accused under Turkish law of an act of criminal negli-
gence aboard his own ship that led to the deaths of several Turkish sailors. The court's
assertion that the "rules of law binding upon states ... emanate from their own free
will as expressed in conventions or usages generally accepted as expressing principles of
law" provides a frequently cited explanation for the source of treaty obligations and
international customary norms. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.). 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
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sovereign action or consent. Rather, what follows is a difficult juxtapo-
sition of sovereign autonomy with systemic deference or passivity.
Thus, the general notion that a state "may not exercise its power in any
form in the territory of another state ''e2 is accompanied by the caveat
that "it does not . . . follow that international law prohibits the state
from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case
which relates to acts which have taken place abroad.
'63
One needs only a touch of cynicism in order to conclude from the
Lotus decision that while sovereignty cannot possibly be absolute, the
court's overriding concern is that the court itself not be the factor that
restricts or invades sovereignty." Instead, Turkey's invasion of French
sovereignty is legitimized as somehow being necessary to a world of
interacting sovereigns and which is then rationalized by the fact that
the self-determination of criminal jurisdiction is crucial to Turkey's
sovereignty. One might conclude, therefore, that the general regime of
liberty under which Turkey is said to operate in pursuing this jurisdic-
tional invasion of France is, as was found in Nationality Decrees in
Tunis and Morocco,65 "an essentially relative question: it depends upon
the development of international relations. 66 The Lotus decision seems
to conceive of the regime of jurisdictional freedom as essentially con-
sensual and, therefore, transient in nature, potentially changing as the
world political order fluctuates from one of libertarianism among states
to one of cooperation.0
The end result of this thinking for international law and its own
characterization of the international legal system is twofold. First, the
positivization of norms along Kelsenian lines not only causes the body
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id.
64. The combined absolute and restricted nature of states' territorial jurisdiction
can be traced to the pronouncements of Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exch.
v. McFaddon, iI U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). Chief Justice Marshall recognized
territorial jurisdiction as "[t]his full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power."
Id.
65. Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco (Gr. Brit. v. Fr.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 4 (Feb. 7).
66. Id. at 30-32 (noting that the extension of French citizenship to British subjects
resident in North Africa was not prohibited in principle, but did violate an Anglo-
French treaty).
67. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 363-72 (discussing international relations as
structured around these two poles of sovereign autonomy and interconnection or coop-
eration); see also Binder, The Dialectic of Duplicity: Treaty Conflict and Political
Contradiction, 34 BUFFALO L. Rav. 329 (1985) (stating that the tensions between na-




of legal sources doctrine to trace its own conceptual origins to the con-
sent of those sovereigns that are bound by such norms, but to couch all
articulations of sovereign restraint in terms of empirical observation of
sovereign action. 68 Second, the system as a normative entity, as opposed
to its assorted participants, is projected as having little force. Thus,
notwithstanding the occasionally optimistic assertion that "the normal
condition of states according to international law ... [is] that the
state has over it no other authority than that of international law,"6'
the international system itself is rarely seen as constituting more than
the sum of its parts. Accordingly, although one sovereign participant in
the system may on its own accord judge and, indeed, punish another
participant for any impingements of sovereignty, the system itself tends
inexorably to articulate only those restraints that can be posed as in-
stances in which unlimited sovereignty is itself defended.
The traditional implication of a legal system in which international
norms are couched in terms of the consensual acts of its sovereign par-
ticipants is that entities other than states neither consent to nor are
bound by the rules of the game and, thus, with rare exception, fail to
qualify as players.7 0 Although nonstate entities have on occasion been
assimilated to the position of sovereigns and for certain purposes have
achieved juridical status equivalent to that of states, 1 individuals have
68. Ironically, sovereigns are told what they can and cannot do in a way that never
deviates from a statement of what they already, in fact, do. This making of normative
statements in empiricist language seems to characterize numerous fields of scholarly
endeavor in the law. Thus, for example, "law and economics" theorists exhibit a ten-
dency to posit wealth maximization as the end goal of legal decision making in a way
that suggests a fundamental ambivalence between a moral preference for economic
efficiency and mere observation and explanation of existing normative phenomenon.
See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 103, 110
(1979) (discussing economic efficiency as the "attractive basis for ethical judgments");
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 29-30 (1972) (positing wealth
maximization as a goal of fault-based tort liability).
69. Austro-Germans Customs Regime, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41 (Advisory
Opinion of Mar. 19) (considering the voluntary alienability of Austrian independence
to Germany).
70. On the notion that a corporation has no juridical status of its own in interna-
tional forums, see Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 4, at 39 (Feb. 5) (noting that only a state in which the corporation is registered
has standing to assert a claim on behalf of a corporation). On the traditional nonsta-
ture of liberation movements in international law, see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (dismissing the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction but noting that tortious acts by Palestinian Liberation Or-
ganization members do not constitute state action and, thus, do not violate interna-
tional law) (Edwards, J., concurring). On the nonconsenting, and thus nonparticipatory
stature of colonies in the international legal system, see Newfoundland Continental
Shelf [1984] 1 S.C.R. 86 (Can.) (tracing the international status of Newfoundland
before and after the Statute of Westminister 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch.4).
71. See Nanni v. Pace and the Sovereign Order of Malta, 8 A.D. 2 (Ital. Corte
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been expressly excluded from such possibilities. 2 Prior to the postwar
development of contemporary human rights doctrine only a few spo-
radic arbitral decisions and treaty provisions concerning the rights of
aliens73 existed on which to take account of individual personality when
dealing with international sovereigns. Indeed, even modern human
rights law is typically propped on the Kelsenian structure of legal posi-
tivism insofar as it is technically seen as binding by virtue of its source
in either treaty or custom, or direct or indirect consent of sovereign
states .
74
Cass. 1935-1937) (attributing international juridical personality to a religious order);
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174,
179 (Advisory Opinion of April 11) (characterizing the United Nations as a holder of
international legal rights).
72. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1) (declaring that
"[o]nly states may be parties in cases before the Court); H. Lauterpacht, Survey of
International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/I/Rev. (1949), in 1 E. LAUT3R-
PACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTER-
PACHT 469-71 (1970) (stating that individuals hold international legal rights solely by
virtue of the intention of state parties to conventions or incorporation of international
law into a state's domestic law).
73. See, e.g., Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30) (holding that an injury to an alien national is
an injury to the foreign state); United States (B.E. Chattin) v. Mexico, 4 U.N.R.I.A.A.
282 (U.S.-Mex. Claims Comm'n 1927) (considering a United States claim of denial of
due process by Mexican authorities to a United States citizen); Briggs, The Settlement
of Mexican Claims Act of 1942, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 222, 222 (1943) (characterizing the
United States-Mexico General Claims Commission as "dilatory, inefficient and unfor-
tunate"); Opinion of Commission of Jurists on Janaina-Corfu Affair, Report to League
of Nations on Corfu Dispute, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 543, 543 (1924) (finding that "[t]he
recognized public character of a foreigner and the circumstances in which he is present
in its territory, entail upon the State a corresponding duty of special vigilance on his
behalf').
74. Typical sources cited on behalf of human rights protection include the follow-
ing: U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3 (declaring one of the purposes of the United Na-
tions to be the promotion and respect of human rights among states); Universal Decla-
ration On Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), 3 (1) U.N. GAOR at 71, Doc. A/810
(1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 220, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950); American Convention
on Human Rights, OASOR OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2, Jan. 7,
1970, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 672 (1970); see also Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal.2d 718,
721-25, 242 P.2d 617, 620-22 (1952) (stating that human rights are only enforceable
when they qualify as binding treaty provisions and are thus "supreme law of the
land"). For discussions on the sources of international human rights, see generally
Henkin, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 6 PROC. GEN. ED. SEM. 7 (1977);
L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(1973); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1973);
Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clause of the
Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (1972) (discussing whether human rights are now
binding on signatores of the United Nations Charter).
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Of course, the ability of sovereigns to allocate individual rights as
they see fit points not so much to an exclusion of individuals from the
international system, but rather to a traditional perception of individu-
als as significant solely in their capacity as appendages of their own
sovereign. For this reason, the legal rights of aliens were able to
achieve prominence in an era when individual or personal rights per se
were otherwise excluded from international discourse.75 As underlings
of a particular sovereign umbrella, individuals were accorded the atten-
tion of the international system only when impingements upon them
could readily be translated into an interference by one sovereign with
the national insulation or autonomy of another.7 6
With the postwar maturation of international legal discourse, and
the transition from the ambiguously passive League of Nations Cove-
nant to the affirmatively active United Nations Charter,7 7 came a dis-
tinct rise in the level of rhetorical self-confidence. This development
from the halting pronouncements of the PCIJ to the relatively assertive
holdings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), is perhaps best
illustrated by the delegitimization of Liechtenstein's citizenship laws in
The Nottebohm Case.78 Liechtenstein brought the action against Gua-
temala, alleging the latter's mistreatment of one of the former's nation-
als; however, the court was seduced into its own self-assertion by Gua-
temala's defensive tactic of transforming the substance of
75. An examination of international law cases in which individuals are attributed
with legally enforceable rights reveals that the basis for the enforceability is typically
expressed in terms of the nonapplicability of international law. Thus, by way of illus-
tration, where a proprietary entitlement depends on the court's assessment of the acts
of an unrecognized government, the property right of the person is protected by virtue
of judicial willingness not to apply international law; to overlook the lack of de jure
recognition in favor of an acknowledgment of de facto recognition. See Sokoloff v. Na-
tional City Bank of New York, 239 N.Y. 158, 165-66, 145 N.E. 917, 918-19 (1924)
(recognizing the de facto government of Soviet Russia and its full effect in Russian
law, regardless of the effect of the refusal of the United States government to recognize
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the government of Russia); M. Salimoff &
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 226-27, 186 N.E. 679, 682 (1933) (refusing to
ignore the existence of the Soviet government and thus nullifying an attempt to present
a tort claim against United States purchasers of land confiscated from Soviet nationals
by the Soviet Russian government).
76. See D. HARRIS, supra note 24, at 123 (discussing the traditional expression of
this viewpoint). Harris states: "[flor the most part, however, the individual remains an
object, not a subject, of international law whose most important characteristic for inter-
national law purposes is his nationality . . . It is nationality. . . that decides whether
an individual can benefit from treaty guarantees that a state secures for its 'nation-
als."' Id.
77. See Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 841, 952-56
(1987) (discussing the rhetorical structure of the founding documents of international
institutions).
78. The Nottebohm (Liecht. v. Guat.) 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
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Liechtenstein's claim into a debate over its stature as a claimant. The
court used the adjudication as an opportunity to elaborate upon its own
doctrine of standing, and produced a surprisingly restrictive rule. Its
ultimate declaration that "[i]t is international law which determines
whether a state is entitled to exercise protection [over its self-declared
citizens]"" effectively separated the question of domestic legality from
that of international validity, and set the stage for what appears in the
result to be a forceful assertion of systemic power over autonomous sov-
ereign power.
The point is not that the ICJ has found the strength to restrict in a
metaconstitutional way any and all state action. While the Nottebohm
decision enforces a relatively far reaching notion of sovereign restraint
in the context of international legal process, it exhibits the court's un-
willingness to enforce similar restraint on substantive grounds. While
Liechtenstein's unorthodox citizenship rules were found to undermine
the relevant participatory norms of the international system, Guate-
mala's mistreatment of an individual was found to be within the sub-
stantive scope of sovereign power.8 Accordingly, the case displays both
an increase in systemic power and a continuation of normative ambiva-
lence with respect to the relationship between the participants in the
system, i.e. sovereign states, and their own constituent members. Indi-
viduals continue to be factored out of the discourse in deference to sov-
ereign stature. Restraints on the assertion of state power, however, are
imposed in such a way as to suggest that where the process or interna-
tional participatory concerns about the definition of nationhood are at
stake, the relationship between the state and its individuals will be im-
portant in a way that rarely manifests when the concerns are those of
an individual's stature as against the state.81
79. Id. at 21.
80. Id.
81. The normative ambivalence and rhetorical jumps between process doctrines and
substantive doctrines continues to characterize the structure of international legality
into the 1980s. For example, the debate over the "legality" of United States actions in
support of paramilitary activities against Nicaragua has tended to vacillate along the
process-substance continuum, at times focused on the substantive concerns of human
rights and armed intervention, and at other times deflected into considerations of re-
gional participatory institutions and questions of justiciability. See Chayes, Nicaragua,
the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1445, 1450-51 (1985)
(presenting United States arguments in defense of its withdrawal from the ICJ's com-
pulsory jurisdiction on grounds analogous to domestic notions of political questions and
jurisdictional limits based on separation of powers); Moore, The Secret War in Central
America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 90-92 (1986) (assert-
ing that United States actions in support of the Nicaraguan "contras" constitute exer-
cises of collective or regional self-defense); D'Amato, Nicaragua and International
Law: The 'Academic' and the 'Real,' 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 659 (1985) (concluding
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Doctrinally, the result of these maneuvers is the attribution of en-
forceable rights or their corresponding obligations to individuals only
when traced to a source in their home state's consent. The nature of
international systemic authority is such that it refers to and reflects
upon sovereigns in their external or interactive dimensions, leaving the
internal communities of which the various sovereign constituencies are
comprised to a different level of legal authority composed solely of do-
mestic norms.8 2 The willingness of the ICJ to scrutinize a state's mem-
bership rules with respect to an individual connotes the reinforcement,
rather than the denial, of the traditional suffocation of individual stat-
ure within the personality of the parent state. Both before and after
Nuremberg, the international legal system presents itself as the author-
itative embodiment not of individualized universality, but of a world-
wide community of communities. Individuals are not unimportant, but
their importance lies in their belonging to, rather than in their opposi-
tion to, a nation.
E. EMOTION AND PEOPLEHOOD
The second philosophical position evoked by war crimes adjudica-
tions is that which explains not the stature of autonomous individuals,
but the bonding of national peoples into collectivities. Although the
parallel is not exact, the contemporary work of Roberto Unger approxi-
mates an equally irreducible and alternatively powerful construction of
personality to that based on rational thought. Much as Hegel draws on
ancient tradition in abstracting the notion of right from the particulari-
ties of social or individualized contexts83 and on the Kantian tradition
in tracing personality to the capacity to reason and willfully act, Unger
presents a modernist reconstruction of the by no means novel "Chris-
that beneath the traditional international rules of conduct lies a basic concern for
human rights); Kahn, supra note 48, at 4 (arguing that the United States position
translates substantive offense into state practice).
82. Compare The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. at 24-27
(Sept. 7) (asserting that vessels on the high seas are not subject to the authority of
nearest coastal state) with Schroeder v. Bissel (The Over The Top case) 5 F.2d 838,
842 (2d Cir. 1925) (permitting enforcement of Coast Guard antismuggling operations
beyond internationally recognized territorial waters). These conflicting rules evidently
refer to different levels of legal authority, reflecting different conceptions of commu-
nity. While the United States in its international relations is restricted (or perhaps
more accurately has consented to restricting itself) to the jurisdiction delineated by the
international law of territorial seas and contiguous zones, it encounters no such restric-
tions vis-A-vis the constituents of its own national community.
83. Aristotle pointed out that the requirements of justice must be kept conceptually
distinct from the assorted virtues of character, which distinguish between persons. AR-
ISTOTLE, supra note 46, at 377-78.
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tian-romantic image of man. 84 Indeed, the inspiration for this work
reaches as far back as classical Confucianism because it attempts to
scrutinize existing forms of direct relations between people and to draw
from this "small coin[age] of personal encounter. . . whole schemes of
social life."85
For present purposes, Unger's extensive account of the life of the
passions need not be examined beyond the introductory idea of the
work; the point is to put forward an alternative concept of human rela-
tions to that of abstract right and to demonstrate how it, too, is symbol-
ically vindicated through the drama of retribution. Thus, just as an
understanding of personhood does not require one to delve into the fur-
ther reaches of Hegelian thought with respect to the move from ab-
stract right to the state,88 a basic comprehension of peoplehood does
not require one to flesh out, as it were, the psychosocial battle between
love and hate (and their respective offspring) within the realm of the
passions that occupy much of Unger's thought. Rather, what must be
emphasized is that just as the capacity for rationality is a distinguish-
ing mark of human existence, so the drive toward emotional bonding is
a nonseverable element in the human character.
Unger's opening portrayal is not a particularly happy one. The world
is posed as a place that is all too "real and dense and dark," at which
each lonely person gazes in "unspeakable horror" and perceives "the
other things, the other people" as being "there for [d]esire . . .to feed
on."81 Staggering out of this self-centered vacuum and groping toward
the world of others, the individual "discovers that the people in it live
in mutual longing and jeopardy. This discovery is the beginning of pas-
sion";88 in the Ungerian portrayal it marks the commencement of an
entire existence characterized by "engagement in shared forms of
life."89 The greater part of Unger's work is then occupied by what is
termed the problems of solidarity - the tension played out in this life
of passion between the potential of such community with others to lead
to depersonalization within an entrenched hierarchy of power, and the
promise of a transformative or liberating experience that radical ac-
84. R. UNGER, supra note 15, at vii.
85. Id. at 66. Unger states that "[c]lassical Confucianism offers insights into the
problem of solidarity that have never been surpassed by any other tradition of compa-
rable influence." Id.
86. The very structure of Hegel's Philosophy of Right implies this sequential devel-
opment, moving from the notion of right to its perfection in the nation state and, fi-
nally, to its expression in the international realm.
87. R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 95.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 96.
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ceptance by others offers to all individuals.
What is important here, however, is the starting point: the notion
that identity begins with an inherently risky and irrational bond, an
emotional craving for and optimistic sense of "opportunity in associa-
tion."" This has a distinct similarity to an analytic approach to person-
ality found in another facet of Hegel's work: internal interrelatedness."
That is, personal identity is understood as constituted by its interaction
with others in such a way that the idea of solidarity or social belonging
is central to the concept of existence. 2 It is not so much that persons
choose in a calculated or instrumental fashion to interconnect for a de-
sired end, but rather that without such essential connectedness no per-
son escapes the inevitability of becoming a "reality. . .shrinking into
itself."'93
If the emotive connectedness to others is crucial to self-conception, it
is the corollary notion of disconnectedness that gives this version of
identity its practical meaning. While the solidarity of interactive social
life is the definitional medium of meaningful existence, the absence of
association with noninteractive others provides boundaries for the un-
derstanding of the self. Thus, the fundamental human experience of
connectedness and disconnectedness, or similarity and difference, serves
to shape any conception of life in relation to others." The emotional
bonds of similarity constitute the associative self-conceptions of mem-
bers of a community, and the dissociation underlying identifiable differ-
ence provides for the connotation of foreignness attributed to people
lying outside of community bounds. Likewise, the internal cohesions of
different or autonomous societies are mirrored by the external similar-
ity of one such social unit to another in a more expansive version of
community life.95
90. Id. at 99.
91. Cornell, In Union: A Critical View of Toward a Perfected State, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1088, 1091 n.10 (1987).
92. See Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 291, 372 (1985) (identifying an "ethic of citizenship" premised on the idea
of internal interrelatedness); see also Cornell, supra note 91, at 1091 (defining Hegel's
conception of internal interrelatedness as a view in which "[t]he individual is conceived
not as an atomistic being ... but rather as a social reality").
93. R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 95.
94. See Katz, supra note 8, at 384 (providing an elucidation of what is termed
"Boundary Theory" and its application to legal analysis). Katz states: "[h]uman birth
is simultaneously a moment of separation and symbiotic unity that, in addition, inaugu-
rates a history of social connection ... Boundary Theory ... assert[s] that under all
cultural circumstances the primal human experience is constituted by consciousness of
similarity and difference." Id.
95. For an interesting version of the associative and dissociative aspects of identity,
see Katz, Foucault for Lawyers, 33 BUFFALO L. REV. 195, 207 (1984) (stating that
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In the retributory context, the effect of all this is that offenses among
persons linked in emotional solidarity are addressed, and the associative
identities of peoples are vindicated through punishment as an affirma-
tion of the violated social bonds. In contrast, actions performed by per-
sons unrelated and unidentified by such personal connectedness are not
conceived as matters to be addressed by their dissociated counterparts.
Indeed, it is the silence of one cohesive group on the events taking place
within another such group that, in effect, vindicates the meaningful
connectedness that constitutes the existence of each. Where the sym-
bolic, retributive affirmation of existence is conceived as reinforcing the
emotional outreach of the self in its interrelation with others, the dis-
connectedness of some persons becomes as important as the connected-
ness that the punishment dramatically restates. In this way, the emo-
tional bonds of interpersonal experience become translated into notions
of community association that make the potential for human freedom a
reality. From this perspective, therefore, the retributive message affirms
the peoplehood of those who live as one and, conversely, confirms the
peoplehood of those who, from the domestic perspective, do not live as
one.
F. STATE JURISDICTION OVER CRIME
If the structure of international legal authority is problematic to the
Nuremberg endeavor when considered in terms of individuality, the
question remains as to whether the adjudication can be perceived as
having embodied a retributive statement whose purpose was the de-
lineation of separate peoplehoods or nations. What this question in-
volves is a view of the tribunal's criminal process in distinctly
nonuniversalist terms. Given the traditional process deficiencies of in-
ternational law for the case, the logical question is whether the redress
of Nazi crime can be conceived of as a type of simultaneous mono-
logue, or a song sung in unison, by each of the occupying powers.
Could a judgment by Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet
Union be understood as one rendered not in their capacities as repre-
sentatives of the international system, but as sovereigns in their own
right? Given that the most centrally targeted of the defendants' acts
..since we are God's children we are all different and we are all the same"). The expla-
nation provided here takes the conception of individual identity one step up from social
life to intersocietal life, in much the way that international relations as depicted in
international legal discourse tends to mirror the personal relationships portrayed in do-
mestic law. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.) 1928




took place outside the territories and among persons foreign to the
judging states,96 such a staging of the proceedings would have to be
based on prevailing notions of extraterritorial or extranational criminal
law.
Initially, this basis would not seem particularly difficult to establish.
The statutory and case law governing the delineation of domestic crimi-
nal law jurisdiction in general appears so confused and internally con-
tradictory that the rule might properly be formulated as one in which
anything is permitted. For every assertion that sovereign authority is by
nature "incapable of conferring [on courts] extraterritorial power,""
there is a competing pronouncement that "any state may impose liabili-
ties, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its
borders." 98 Each articulation and reiteration of the restricted territorial
scope of criminal process99 is matched with a corresponding finding
that disobedience to domestic laws through conduct abroad renders a
person subject to criminal punishment in her home courts.10 Finally,
the general proposition that domestic laws are presumptively inapplica-
ble to the foreign acts of either foreign nationals 1 " or domestic nation-
als'02 can readily be juxtaposed with the equally accepted proposition
96. This is not intended, of course, to downplay the extent of German atrocities
perpetrated on the territory and against the personnel and populations of the Allied
powers, nor to understate the extent to which each of the occupying powers may have
been or felt particularly victimized. Rather, the point is to emphasize that the difficult
theoretical core of the Nuremberg case revolves around Allied punishment of German
actions committed within Germany itself.
97. The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
98. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
99. For a summary of this line of criminal process thinking, see MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.03 (2-4) (1985) (discussing domestic jurisdiction over criminal acts commit-
ted within a foreign territory).
100. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1932) (upholding pun-
ishment for contempt of court as applicable to a subpoenaed witness, a United States
resident domiciled in France); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 99 (S.D.N.Y.
1922) (applying the offense of conspiracy to defraud applicable to activities pursued on
the high seas).
101. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1956)
(finding that the Lanham Act does not apply to trademark infringement by a Canadian
corporation in Canada); McCullough v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras,
372 U.S. 10, 13 (1963) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply
to maritime operations of foreign vessels employing alien sailors).
102. See United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1005 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that the Marine Mammal Protection Act does not apply to United States citizens com-
mitting violations outside of United States territory but within territory of a foreign
sovereign). For specific statutory reference to liability of United States nationals
abroad, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (West Supp. 1986) (providing that "whoever owing
allegiance to the United States, levies war against [it] or adheres to [its] enemies, is
guilty of treason and shall suffer death"); I.R.C. § 7701(a)(39) (1986) (providing that
"if a citizen or resident of the United States is not found in any U.S. judicial district,
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that a state may regulate the conduct of either foreigners"' or its own
citizens'04 outside of its territory with respect to any matter in which it
has an interest.
The reluctance of the international legal system to acknowledge an
independent stature for anyone or anything that can be conceptually
subsumed under the personality of a particular sovereign entity is not
mirrored by domestic legal process. United States courts have made it
clear that, notwithstanding occasional references to such notions as "in-
ternational comity" and the inherent limitations of interacting sover-
eign states, 10 5 federal and state regulatory and criminal provisions have
potential worldwide application. 10 The judiciary, therefore, gives the
appearance of believing that the value system that inheres to the do-
mestic law is properly conceived as universal in scope.1
0 7
In articulating the proposition in so categorical a fashion, however, it
is evident that one greatly overstates the United States judicial posi-
tion. It seems jarring to any sense of legal structure to assert that, inso-
far as either the federal or the state courts are concerned, there is no
such citizen will be treated as residing in the District of Columbia for the purposes of
any provision of this title relating to jurisdiction of courts or enforcement of sum-
mons"). In many cases the applicability of United States laws to the conduct of United
States nationals abroad is judicially inferred from the nature of the statutory provision.
See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1922) (stating that the application
of strict territorial jurisdiction would curtail the usefulness of the conspiracy statute).
103. See United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.,
133 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (applying the Sherman Antitrust Act to acts of a
Swiss corporation).
104. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 76 (1941) (convicting a United States
defendant for violating a Florida state statute forbidding the taking of sponges off the
Florida coast, despite conduct having taken place outside United States territorial wa-
ters). The opinion noted that the United States has authority over the waters and over
the sponge fishery. Id.
105. See Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Trans-
portes, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (restricting
the sovereign immunity doctrine to instances in which international comity is served).
106. Although United States courts have been the most forceful in this regard, the
phenomenon is typical of most domestic legal systems. Certainly in the common law
world, a similar pattern of extraterritorial and extranational jurisdictional application
has developed. See generally Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, [ 1973] App. Cas.
807 (H.L.) (upholding a conviction for smugglers transhipping drugs from Europe
through Britain to the United States); Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 21
C.C.C. 206 (Sup. Ct. Can.) (upholding a conviction for a Canadian participant in a
conspiracy to sell fraudulent stock certificates in the United States, Costa Rica, and
Panama).
107. A similar strand of thought can be identified in various conflict of law cases
where the choice of law is said to necessarily be that of the domestic forum whenever
the otherwise applicable foreign law "would violate some fundamental principle of jus-
tice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of common




difference whatsoever between an act taking place on the north or the
south side of the Rio Grande or of Niagara Falls.108 In fact, where a
conclusion takes on such an appearance, the courts have strained to
find a point of distinction between the ordinary cross-border instances
of judicial deference or hands-off, and the hands-on approach being
pursued. Thus, by way of illustration, the United States Supreme
Court's application of a state civil rights statute to an excursion vessel
and amusement park on a Canadian island in Lake Michigan"'9 was
accompanied by a perversely deferential and imperialistic assurance
that "no detraction whatever from [Canada's] sovereignty is implied by
saying that the business itself is economically and socially an island of
local Detroit business." 110
As is evident, it is nearly impossible to reconcile the wide array of
cases in which domestic courts have either asserted or declined jurisdic-
tion over foreign events. Indeed, the case law seems kaleidoscopic in its
effect, at times focusing on the substantive right or wrong of the indi-
vidual litigant in terms of the domestic legal norm, and at other times
focusing on the right of the foreign state to be the sole judge of acts
taking place within its boundaries. Nevertheless, a relatively straight-
forward, though coded message can be gleaned from the otherwise ob-
tuse doctrinal references to the competing notions of "sovereignty,"
"state interests," 11 "territoriality," and "effects or consequences, 11 2
108. Indeed, there are usually said to be serious constitutional impediments to one
state in the United States attempting to extend its legal process or its regulatory reach
into the territory of another state, to say nothing of impinging upon the territory of a
foreign nation. Thus, the "police power" attributed by Chief Justice Marshall to the
states in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443 (1827) was historically
tempered by one application or another of commerce clause doctrine. See The License
Cases, (Thurlow v. Mass.) 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847) (stating that "the police
powers of a state are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions"); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (holding no state maintains authority over matters touching on
commerce in another state or between states). In modern doctrinal terms, the limita-
tions on state powers take the form of an inquiry into whether the subject matter in
question is local in character. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
317-18 (1851) (upholding the state power requiring ships to use local pilots when en-
tering or leaving port); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 406-08
(1988) (providing an historical overview and general discussion of the Cooley decision
and its subsequent development).
109. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 34-35 (1948) (holding that
commercial excursions between Detroit, Michigan and Bois Blanc Island, Ontario do
not constitute commerce with a foreign nation within the meaning of the commerce
clause under the particular facts of this case).
110. Id. at 36.
111. For a juxtaposition of the sovereignty of a foreign state, which must be
respected, and the interests of the domestic state, which must be protected, see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
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and so on. The idea is that, in order for the court to assume jurisdic-
tion, the regulatory, criminal, or other offensive act must have been
committed within or against the community whose authority the court
reflects. Accordingly, despite the presumably universal character of the
prohibition on murder, United States courts do not typically find them-
selves seized of any given case of extraterritorial homicide unless some
factual wrinkle causes the defendant's act to be conceptually assimi-
lated to the community that the forum's law reflects.113
Perhaps the best illustrations of the two possible ways of viewing the
interplay between substance and jurisdiction, or normative universality
and territorial or national insulation, are provided by cases in which
domestic legal process directly contravenes considerations identified as
belonging to international law. In Blackmer v. United States,11 4 the
petitioner, a United States citizen residing in France, challenged the
power of Congress and the District of Columbia courts to require him
to appear as a witness in a trial in Washington, D.C., and to adjudge
him guilty of contempt of court for his failure to appear. In particular,
the petitioner questioned the validity of the statute empowering the
trial judge to order a subpoena addressed to the United States consul in
Paris and served on the witness,11 5 alleging that "Congress has no
power to authorize U.S. consuls to serve process except as permitted by
treaty.""16
The case highlights both the differences and similarities between the
domestic law of extraterritorial jurisdiction and international law. The
petitioner's challenge framed the issue as one of domestic legislative
and judicial power versus international sovereign capacity with the im-
plication that only one of the legal systems must govern. The two sys-
tems, the former exercising its territorially unlimited sovereign author-
ity and the latter with its consensually induced territorial restraints
absent some alternative treaty arrangement, were posed as embodying
(1965) (attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory).
112. See id. § 18 (providing a similar juxtaposition as that identified in Bob-Lo
Excursion Co. v. Michigan this time with respect to conduct occurring outside the
territory of a state that has effects within it).
113. The notion that jurisdiction over an offense reflects a conception of the com-
munity within or against which the offense was committed has ancient common law
origins. See Regina v. Keyn, [1876] 2 Ex. D. 63, 159 (Cr. Cas. Res.) [1876]
(Cockburn, C.J., concurring). Cockburn states that "[b]y the old common law of Eng-
land, every offence was triable in the county only in which it had been committed, as
from that county alone the 'pais' as it was termed - in other words, the jurors by
whom the fact was to be ascertained - could come." Id. at 162.
114. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
115. The trial judge acted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1982).
116. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932).
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a doctrinal contradiction. In the petitioner's view, the sober and cooper-
ative route of international legality could be sharply contrasted with
the "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable" assertion of extraterrito-
rial domestic legal process.17
In turn, the controversy pits the relationship of individual Americans
with the national community of which they are members against the
relationship of the United States and France as members of the inter-
national community. The difference between the two doctrinal systems
is ultimately reducible to the different visions of community that the
systems embody or reflect. Thus, notwithstanding the apparently sharp
distinction between the two versions of legality, there is a marked simi-
larity in their theoretical undercurrents. In its technical language, the
court concluded with the point that, "[w]ith respect to such an exercise
of [extraterritorial] authority, there is no question of international law
. . . . [because] [t]he jurisdiction of the United States over its absent
citizen. . is a jurisdiction in personam."11 8 Translated to the plane of
systemic self-conception, the statement points to an identity of ap-
proach between international and domestic law; each presents itself as
a normative embodiment of a particular version of community. The
judge's doctrinal choice under the circumstances designates the com-
munity that the substantive law at issue, as well as the forum's judicial
powers, serves.
In choosing to treat the petitioner in Blackmer as a citizen of the
United States rather than as a resident of France, the court permits
United States legal process to extend its reach into French territory in
apparent contradiction to many of its former pronouncements that
seemed to bar any such extraterritorial reach. Nevertheless, this choice
provides a graphic illustration of the conceptual structure that makes
this otherwise inscrutable body of case law somehow coherent. Al-
though the holdings are essentially irreconcilable, the fundamental
theme that runs through all of the foreign jurisdictional case law is that
of "we/they." ' 9 In taking or declining jurisdiction over events that oc-
curred abroad, or over events that occurred among foreigners at
home,120 the courts make a statement as to whether such events are
117. Id.
118. Id. at 437-38.
119. See Morgan, Criminal Process, International Law and Extraterritorial
Crime, 39 U. TORoNTo L.J. (forthcoming) (elaborating on this theme with respect to
criminal process and foreign persons and events).
120. The extraterritorial question is, in one sense, merely the reverse side of the
coin raised by the various aspects of sovereign immunity for foreigners acting within
the domestic territorial bounds. Thus, the distinction between a foreign state's official
or governmental actions and its "commercial activity" embodied in the Foreign Sover-
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conceived as having taken place among "us" or among "them."
Legal authority as structured by the doctrines of extraterritorial and
extranational jurisdiction, therefore, provides a direct reflection of the
concept of community embedded in a given normative statement. In
this sense, it is difficult to read the judicial process of the Nuremberg
tribunal as an exercise of the four powers' ordinary, if extended, crimi-
nal law. The Allies' dramatic assertion of judicial power over Germans
acting as Germans, or the leaders of a foreign nation acting in their
capacities as such, seems directly contrary to the understanding of
community that the jurisdictional link between the forum and the de-
fendant symbolically expresses. From the point of view of the separate
British, French, United States, and Soviet sovereigns, all of which were
tangentially touched but none of which were central to the depravity
addressed at Nuremberg, the message of "we/they" evoked by such
unilateral extensions of domestic criminal process simply does not ring
true. After all, the tribunal's formal condemnation of Nazi crime was
not directed essentially at what the Third Reich did to the foreign na-
tions sitting in judgment.12' The retribution embodied by the Nurem-
berg judgment was aimed, in the first instance, at what Germans did to
people within their own community bounds - what they did to "them-
selves" rather than what they did to "us."
G. CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND SYMBOLIC EXISTENCE
Before returning to the Nuremberg decision and examining the pre-
cise way that the tribunal worked out its difficult jurisdictional quan-
eign Immunities Act can be explained in terms of an attempt to distinguish between
acts that concern the domestic community and those that are solely the business of the
foreign nation. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90
Stat. 289 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1982)); see Changed Policy Concern-
ing the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 DEP'T. ST. BULL.
984, 984 (1952) [hereinafter the Tate Letter] (providing the well-known assertion of
this position); see also Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimien-
tos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965)
(citing the Tate Letter, and the State Department's hesitancy to grant sovereign immu-
nity to friendly nations engaged in commercial activity).
121. This, of course, is somewhat overstated. In fact, the Nuremberg case did ad-
dress the violations by the Nazi regime of international treaties and of customary inter-
national law vis-d-vis obligations owed to other sovereign states. The Agreement for the
Establishment of an International Military Tribunal, 5 U.N.T.S. 251 (1945); see also
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 582 U.N.T.S. 279, re-
printed in Official Document Supplement, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 257 (1945) (calling
expressly for the tribunal to consider "Crimes Against Peace" and "War Against Hu-
manity"). It is no exaggeration to say, however, that it is the latter category that makes
the case so historically unique and lies at its analytical heart.
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dry, it is worthwhile to put the two concepts of personality that seem to
underlie judicial thinking into the perspective of retributory case law,
where they find their clearest expression. In particular, it is necessary
to contemplate the ways that jurisdictional concerns and substantive
notions of wrong and right, or process issues and philosophical message,
might interrelate in providing a coherent symbolic statement with re-
spect to personal and social identity. This entails an interweaving of
themes from both levels of expression and thought. The ultimate sym-
bolism of retribution entails a complex relationship between the ration-
ality of personhood and the individuality of criminal responsibility, ver-
sus' the emotional bonds of peoplehood and the assertion and limits of
sovereign jurisdiction. The Nuremberg case endeavors to capture and
express this deep and complex structure to human self-identity.
The drama of retribution operates on a number of planes. As judi-
cially presented in the form of criminal liability, it is perhaps best ap-
preciated when compared to those judgments of culpability from which
it differs. In particular, retributory cases in their basic noninstrumental
posture are more clearly comprehended when placed within the context
of contemporary theoretical debate over whether "the theatre should be
viewed primarily as an engaged social phenomenon or as a[n] . . . aes-
thetic artifact." 22 The essential thrust of the judicial message being
evocative of an idealized reality rather than oriented toward social
change, these cases are most naturally housed within the latter cate-
gory of expression.123 The factor that differentiates these cases from
more commonplace articulations of criminal guilt is their symbolic
statement of human freedom that, although specifically situated with
reference to the vindicated community, is for the most part uncon-
cerned with an actual (or, at least, an immediate) social effect.
This version of criminal liability, therefore, focuses on personality
rather than on the particular arrangements of social life.' 24 By con-
trast, the instrumental utilization of criminal law tends to veer away
from any such assertion of idealized human freedom and move toward
more active social engagement: the narrative ploy detracting attention
from either the personhood of the defendant or the peoplehood of her
122. M. CARLSON, THEORIES OF THE THEATRE 454 (1984) (indicating that "a sig-
nificant amount of contemporary theoretical discourse can still be oriented in terms of
this opposition").
123. See THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1456 (R. McKeon ed. 1941) (discuss-
ing Aristotle's concept of art as reflecting a process or movement from the extant mate-
rial world of partially realized forms toward their ideal realizations).
124. In Unger's terms, it is in just such a noninstrumental expression of personality
that embodies the human "quest for freedom - for the basic freedom that includes an
assurance of being at home in the world." R. UNGER, supra note 15, at 107.
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community. Like any dramatic expression, no legal text can be identi-
fied as lying purely on one or the other side of the activist/aesthetic
divide. The primary distinctions between an instrumentalist and a re-
tributionist message, however, can readily be perceived when they are
grouped in a general way around this familiar opposition.
Consider an illustration in the decision of the Michigan court in Peo-
ple v. Noble,1 z5 where the defense argued the justification of the de-
fendant's prison escape in view of the intolerability of his confinement
with aggressive homosexual inmates. The court convicted the defend-
ant, premising its decision on the imperative of avoiding "a rash of
escapes, all rationalized by unverifiable tales of sexual assaults."12 The
decision leaves one with the sensation that the subject matter of the
litigation was not the accused person himself, but the system in which
he exists; the efficient running of a prison requires a conviction in the
present case, and an acquittal might be exploited by others whose cases
would present evidentiary problems. Nowhere, as Hegel would have it,
is the rationality of the impugned act assessed and its imputation of
reciprocity carried out. Thus, the ultimate statement of liability seeks
to do something other than to reflect an idealized, rationality-based
view of personality, and is accordingly difficult to read as anything re-
sembling an assertion of human right for its own symbolic sake.
1 27
In the emotional-based and community-oriented view of personality,
the distinction between instrumental punishment and criminal liability
as a symbolic vindication of freedom is equally sharp. One might con-
sider, for example, the competing arguments raised in the California
case of People v. Woody.128 The defendants, a group of Navajo Indians
who were arrested while engaged in a religious ceremony at a remote
desert location, were charged under a state statute prohibiting the un-
authorized possession of peyote. 29 As in the Noble case, the prosecu-
tion framed its argument in a way that conceived of the defendants'
culpability as a link in a chain of cause and effect. That is, not only
was use of the hallucinogenic substance said to be harmful to the Indi-
ans and their children, but the "threat of fraudulent assertions of reli-
125. People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d 916 (1969).
126. Id. at 303, 170 N.W.2d at 918.
127. One might note that the concern expressed in Noble that future escapes will
be argued as justified due to unverifiable circumstances seems to imply that an accused
in possession of sufficient evidence (such as appears to be the case with Mr. Noble
himself) might in a similar case present a defense that the court would be inclined to
accept.
128. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
129. CAL. ANN. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500 (codified as amended at CAL.
ANN. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350 (1975)).
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gious immunity" were said to "render impossible the effective enforce-
ment of the narcotic laws."' 30
The answer, as provided by the defense in Woody and accepted by
the court, stressed the spiritual significance of the drug to the commu-
nity of peyotists, indicating that traditional Native American religious
practitioners "regard peyote . . as a 'teacher' because it induces a
feeling of brotherhood with other members." 13' The idea was to em-
phasize the essential disconnectedness, or social dissociation that exists
between the community represented by the state's legal system, and
that existing among the emotionally bonded Navajo group. While lia-
bility on the prosecution's grounds might serve to change behavioral
patterns and facilitate law enforcement generally, the defense made it
clear that the purportedly universalist thrust of such a judgment could
not be read as an idealization of the emotive bonds which constitute
personality, nor could it stand as a symbolic message of freedom in the
form of a vindicated notion of peoplehood.
The judgments in both Noble and Woody might fruitfully be com-
pared to that of the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States. 32 In
Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that Congress could constitutionally
apply a prohibition against multiple marriages to a defendant who ad-
hered to the polygamist tenets of the Mormon faith.' 33 Interestingly, in
addition to the evident desire of the court to eradicate a particular so-
cial practice, the finding of criminal culpability is expressed in a way
that dramatically embraces both the autonomous and the communitar-
ian visions of freedom from what is deemed an otherwise dually oppres-
sive act 34 - symbolically voicing the rational and the emotional char-
acteristics constitutive of personality. Thus, in the judgment's crucial
130. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 721, 394 P.2d 813, 818-19, 40 Cal. Rptr.
69, 74-75 (1964).
131. Id. at 720, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
132. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
133. In Woody, the court discussed the decision in Reynolds v. United States and
indicated that "[t]he Mormon doctrine of polygamy rested in alleged divine origin and
imposed upon male members ... the observance of the practice upon pain of eternal
damnation." People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 723, 394 P.2d 813, 819-20, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 75-76 (1964).
134. This assessment conforms generally to the debate over the precise source of
the offensive quality of polygamist acts. That is, multiple marriages are on occasion
perceived as offensive to the spouse's sense of equality and relational mutuality. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1 (1980) (noting that a second marriage constitutes provo-
cation to the first spouse and may undermine her various legal interests). On other
occasions, however, polygamy is perceived as more of a public than a private affront.
See M. BASsiOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 372 (1978) (asserting that prohibi-
tions on bigamy represent "the value judgments of a given society since others have
found bigamy to be perfectly acceptable social behavior").
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jassage, the court declares:
Upon. . . [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring
social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is nec-
essarily required to deal. . .. [P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle...
which . fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot
long exist in connection with monogamy. 3
The portrait of the individual goes beyond that provided in Noble;
the emphasis is at least as much on the abstract equality and corre-
sponding dignity of the person as it is on the instrumental value of the
defendant vis-h-vis others similarly situated. Likewise, while the judg-
ment expresses a concern for a behavioral transition, as did the prose-
cution in Woody, its focus on overriding the individual's marital choice
is primarily on the associative bonds, or intrinsic connectedness of the
defendant with the rest of his society; this time, however, the result is
integrationist rather than separatist. In Reynolds the Mormans were
identified as belonging to the American social fabric in a way that mir-
ror-images the separate cultural identity attributed to American Indi-
ans in Woody.
The essential message of Reynolds is one of both autonomy and ab-
stract equality of the individual and of the individual's inescapable
identity as part of a greater social whole. Although the two strands
seem in one sense to be contradictory, the case makes it clear that
neither is complete without being juxtaposed with the other. It makes
no more sense to concern oneself with the symbolic vindication of ab-
stract individuals with whom one is disconnected in self-conception,
than it does to concern oneself with the free existence of socially affili-
ated but impersonal entities such as property and pets. The point is
that if the freedom from oppression that characterizes an idealized ver-
sion of human reality operates on both a personal and a communitarian
level, and if these are further reducible to the rationality and emotions
that are together constitutive of personality, then any such symbolic
affirmation of these psychological and normative attributes will natu-
rally encompass both. Otherwise, one is presented with a dramatic por-
trayal of only half a person - a counterintuitive and notoriously dys-
functional ideal.3'3
135. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878).
136. See VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 47 (N. Torrey ed. 1946) (creating a satirical por-
trayal of an old woman who, after surviving the ravishes of a band of cannibalistic
soldiers, finds herself pondering the impossibility of completing a horseback journey in
her reduced state: "I will ride behind Mademoiselle Cunegonde, (although I can hardly
keep my seat with only one buttock) . . ").
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H. NUREMBERG: PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE REVISITED
In terms of traditional structures of legal authority, the Nuremberg
case presents a puzzle. In seeking to judge individuals rather than the
German state, the tribunal dissociated its deliberations from the discur-
sive framework prevailing in international law. Likewise, in adjudicat-
ing and punishing the offensive acts of Germans at home, the tribunal
removed itself from the thought structure of domestic legal process.
While the substantive notions of criminality that drove the tribunal to
condemn the genocidal acts of the defendants are readily apparent,
what conception of adjudicative authority - reducible to a vision of
community - made the Nuremberg judges tick?
In this regard, the most revealing passage found in the Nuremberg
opinion defines the term "crimes against humanity." In setting out its
frame of reference as an adjudicative authority over certain types of
substantive offenses, the tribunal offers in one breath a straightforward
definition of criminality and a circular reference back to those acts
within its jurisdictional scope.1 37 Given that the phrase "crimes against
humanity" is the major contribution of the Nuremberg Charter to the
modern legal lexicon (reflecting the major contribution, as it were, of
Nazism to our understanding of the possible extremes of human behav-
ior), its original definition is surprisingly obtuse.
In so defining its authority, the tribunal quite clearly positions itself
as coming from outside rather than from within the German legal sys-
tem; and, accordingly, it is irrelevant to the question of guilt that the
defendants' acts may have been committed in furtherance rather than
in violation of existing German law. Indeed, in one sense it would ap-
pear that positive legality has little to do with these types of offensive
acts. In its opening clause, the definition section lists a variety of inhu-
mane acts as offensive without any reference to a source in a particular
political community or legal system. The implication seems clear that it
is the very inhumanity of the acts that qualifies them as offensive in
any conceivable community, thus giving the phrase a natural law con-
notation reminiscent of an earlier era of international discourse.1 3
137. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 22, art. 6(c). The article states:
Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, de-
portation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds,
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
Id. (emphasis added).
138. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing Grotius's approach
to international law).
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The definition of the crime, therefore, may in its opening clause
bring the case a full circle back to the historic attempt to structure
international legality around notions of individualized, natural right.
Substantive wrong is defined with reference to the victimization of per-
sons, not in their capacities as constituents of a given national polity,
but in their uncontextualized stature as persons. 139 This suggests a le-
gal authority over a socially undifferentiated mankind, tracing the nor-
mative force of this doctrine to the inevitable humanity of its subject
matter. The definitional prologue is an upscaled, universalized staging
of criminal liability, in which the form of the case (a judgment of indi-
viduals) parallels its content (the redress of crimes against individuals).
Process, therefore, is depicted as inextricably linked to substance, so
that jurisdiction over the defendants' acts of extermination and enslave-
ment flows naturally to the tribunal from the universal quality of its
human wrongs and correlative rights.
Given the naturalist pose struck by this opening gambit, it is difficult
to interpret the Nuremberg Charter's immediate reference back to
those inhumane acts only "within the jurisdiction of the tribunal." 40 In
the tribunal's view, this clause serves as a temporal limitation, restrict-
ing its adjudicative authority to German criminal acts committed dur-
ing the war years alone. The problem is quite obviously not one of evi-
dence, nor does it stem from any lingering doubt about the nature of
the defendants' prewar acts; indeed, the tribunal asserted pointedly:
"The policy of persecution, repression, and murder of civilians in Ger-
many before the war of 1939 . . . was most ruthlessly carried out. The
persecution of Jews during the same period is established beyond all
doubt.'"1 4 Rather, the commencement of war is simply used as a juris-
dictional cutoff for the entire production. Thus, the judgment concludes
139. For a prominent contemporary example of persons as holders of human rights
unconnected to any social structure, see the various international legal pronouncements
condemning apartheid: Resolution On The So-Called Independent Transkei and Other
Bantustans, G.A. Res. 31/6A, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/
31/39 (1976) (condemning "sham 'independence' of the Transkei"); Resolution On
Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, 418 U.N. SCOR (2046th mtg.) at 5, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/1417 (1977) (urging an end to violence against African people and elimi-
nation of apartheid and racial discrimination); I.L.C. Draft Articles On State Respon-
sibility, [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 90 (defining apartheid as an international
crime). The overall thrust of these resolutions is to condemn the South African policy
of attributing persons legal stature only within racially and ethnically defined social
and political structures, in favor of the attribution of legal stature to all individuals
within the country regardless of social affiliation. See Richardson, Self-Determination,
International Law and the South African Bantustan Policy, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 185, 186-90 (1978) (providing an overview of the South African Bantustan policy).
140. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 22, art. 6(c).
141. Nuremberg in HARRIS, supra note 24, at 559.
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that, "[r]evolting and horrible as many of these crimes were... the
tribunal cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939
were Crimes against Humanity within the meaning of the Charter."'
What comes immediately to mind is the historic tendency of interna-
tional lawyers and decision makers to "positivize" the discourse in
which their discipline is conducted. Much like the well established
translation of universal norms into rules of sovereign consent,"43 the tri-
bunal's strict jurisdictional scrutiny lends the appearance of positive le-
gality to the otherwise blatantly universalist thrust of the dramatic vin-
dication of natural right. In invoking what appears to be a normatively
arbitrary, temporal baseline to the international adjudication, the tribu-
nal, in one sense, supplants substance with process. In doing so, it de-
flects attention from the novelty of its initial all-encompassing, human
base of authority. The tribunal subtlety shifts the emphasis to the par-
ticular criminal inquiry that the sovereign signatories of the Charter
have mandated through consent.
In another sense, however, the positivist language and jurisdictional
device reflect a genuine concern that would be symbolically unrepre-
sented, or perhaps even undermined, if the naturalist implications of
"crimes against humanity" were to remain untempered. The tribunal's
theatric frame of reference pertains to a specific body of criminal acts
coming out of a specific set of historic circumstances. In contrast, the
individualized definition of offenses against natural right would inevita-
bly encompass any and all inhumane acts in any social situation. In
particular, the tribunal was constituted not to adjudicate all wartime
crime in Germany, but rather was limited in its scope to the dramatic
condemnation of defendants whose "offenses have no particular geo-
graphical location. 1 144 The tribunal's self-conception was that of an in-
ternational authority sitting in judgment over acts that somehow dif-
fered from "ordinary" domestic crime. Although from a natural law
point of view there could be no qualitative difference between the inhu-
manity of the death camps and, for instance, a murder performed dur-
ing a bank robbery in Munich,'" the Nuremberg Charter had to make
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing this rhetorical
phenomenon).
144. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 22, art. 2.
145. Perhaps the most famous judicial statement of the notion that one life consti-
tutes the legal and moral equivalent of many lives appears in the classic "defense of
necessity" cases. Therein the utilitarian balance that justifies saving several lives, as
against the taking of a single life, was rejected as a legitimate grounds of defense. See
generally Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Q.B.) (convicting
sailors for killing and cannibalizing a cabin boy); United States v. Holmes, 26 Cas. 360
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the distinction.
The difference between the two types of crime - those that, in the
Charter's words, have no geographic location, and those that have
taken place in Germany - is presented by the tribunal as turning on
the date rather than the location of the events. Underlying this rather
strange reversal of time and place, however, is a message that, when
read in conjunction with other jurisdictional case law, resounds with a
certain thematic coherence. Reading between the judgment's lines, it is
evident that the wartime acts of the German elite at Dachau, and even
Berlin, could not have a location in contemporary geography, because
the country in which the crimes actually took place was not conceived
as housing a nation competent to judge.
The message that the tribunal's opinion evokes, therefore, restates,
with a twist, the motif that dominates the domestic extraterritoriality
cases. The defendants' acts were simply not performed within and
against the German nation as such. Although analyzed from within a
formal framework of personal responsibility, the accused individuals
are perceived and portrayed as having acted on behalf and in further-
ance of the German nation rather than as an affront to the national
will. Accordingly, while postwar German courts effectively adjudicate
such inhumane offenses as murder within domestic German bounds,
only a legal structure representative of a community that is similar in
scope, if not in composition, to the international law community could
effectively dramatize the offenses of the Nazi regime.
Thus, the Nuremberg judgment portrays a novel basis for legal au-
thority, reflecting both the character and scope of the crimes, and the
composition and extent of the community by which the tribunal was
constituted. The irony, however, is that the novelty contrasts the judg-
ment's formal structure. The case is technically staged to penetrate sov-
ereignty in favor of individual responsibility for offensive acts and, thus,
calls its perpetrators to answer to the nations of the world for their
personalized, human wrongs. Yet, like international law, on the other
hand, the judgment dissociates the domestic validity of the impugned
acts from its judgment of their offensive character and focuses instead
on the acts of a nation against others rather than within and against its
own national community. In doing so, the judgment neither defers to
German sovereignty nor disregards German peoplehood, but rather
condemns the defendants and their fellow nationals on everyone else's
behalf.




As a result, it is the world community, not in its guise as distinct
sovereign states but as a socially undifferentiated humanity, that sits in
judgment of the defendants, not in their guise as autonomous individu-
als but as representatives of an entire nation.146 The notion of commu-
nity that the Nuremberg tribunal presents, therefore, is all-encompass-
ing, embracing the human race in its personalized demeanor as well as
in its pose as distinct national groups. The decision speaks as the nor-
mative mouthpiece of this world community, displaying a brand of re-
tributive power more broadly conceived than any prior (or, for that
matter, any subsequent) legal authority. Although the original concep-
tual problem was with the judgment of particular individuals by the
nations of the world, the drama culminates as a symbolic judgment by
a world of individuals of the inhuman deeds of a particular nation.
Looking back, therefore, the dual expression of outrage over the very
dehumanization of individuals anywhere, and of abhorrence at the acts
of an entire national community, provides the Nuremberg opinion with
its uniquely structured message. The negation implied by the condem-
nation is then transformed into a dramatic statement of affirmation by
the very fact that a legal authority has been found by which ultimate
retribution can be achieved. As a piece of legal theater with a world-
wide audience, the symbolic point of the punishment is to reassure peo-
ple everywhere of the rational basis of autonomous personal existence
and the emotional connectedness of peoples in their collective existence
as nations. In looking back at the contradictions of Nazi crime, the
judgment in effect is a celebration of the dual meaningfulness of free-
dom in human life.
II. EICHMANN: "WE WERE SLAVES OF PHARAOH
"147
As with the Nuremberg case, it has long been recognized that the
contentious and interesting questions arising from the decision in Attor-
ney-General of Israel v. Eichmann 48 are primarily those of process
146. Ultimately, the Nuremberg message restates the Haggadah's explanation for
the visitation of the ten plagues on all Egyptians in response to the actions of Pharaoh
alone. "For God said to Abraham: 'Know you that your children will be strangers in a
land not their own. They will be enslaved there and will be oppressed .... The nation
who will oppress them shall however be judged." HAGGADAH, supra note 1, at 11.
147. Id. The first sentence of the response to the questions that introduce the Pass-
over ceremonies states: "We were slaves of Pharaoh in Egypt and the Eternal our God
brought us out from there with a strong hand and an outstretched arm." Id.
148. The trial judgment of the District Court of Jerusalem appears in unofficial
translation at 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1962). The judgment on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Israel is reported at 36 I.L.R. 277 (1968); see D. HARRIS, supra note 24, at
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rather than substance. That is, the legal debate engendered by the trial
of Adolf Eichmann has centered on the abduction of the defendant
from another sovereign's territory,4 and on the assumption of jurisdic-
tion by the Israeli courts for acts done outside of the territorial bounds
of the state, and prior to its establishment as a sovereign entity. 1 0 In
this instance, however, the jurisdictional issues cannot so readily be dis-
tinguished in the discourse from those involved in the defining of crimi-
nality. The link between the "victims' jurisdiction" asserted by the
court151 and the "crimes against the Jewish people" articulated by the
governing legislation' 52 is too evident for any rhetorical dissociation to
take place, and, as a consequence, one cannot even coherently discuss
the unique questions of criminal or international legal process without
addressing the particular substance of Eichmann's offense.
Adolf Eichmann was the official ultimately in charge of administer-
ing what the Nazi's euphemistically labelled the "final solution to the
Jewish problem": the genocidal policy that directly caused from 4.5
million to 6 million Jewish deaths in Germany and German-occupied
countries.1 53 Before delving into the decision in search of its underlying
retributive message, an examination of the nature of the "Jewish prob-
lem" in the German nationalist consciousness is crucial to understand-
ing the crime. It is, of course, not in any way productive to take the
223-30 [providing the version of the case hereinafter referred to as Eichmann in
HARRIS].
149. Eichmann, a German national by birth, was apparently abducted from Argen-
tina by agents of the Government of Israel in 1960 when no extradition treaty existed
between the two countries. See Six MILLION ACCUSERS 301 (D. Rosenne ed. 1961).
Eichmann had entered Argentina with a Red Cross refugee passport issued under the
false name of Ricardo Klement. Id.
150. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 841-43
(1986) (providing a standard formulation of these contentious legal issues).
151. In this, the trial court drew on the PCIJ decision in The S.S. Lotus case for
the proposition that "the principle of territoriality does not limit the power of a State to
try crimes," and thus asserted that its own "foundation of criminal jurisdiction con-
forms, according to accepted terminology, to the protective principle" in that it ad-
dresses "crimes injuring its subjects or serious crimes against its own safety." Eich-
mann in HARRIS, supra note 148, at 226-27 (quoting I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 147, at 333 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955)).
152. The prosecution was conducted under the authority of the Nazi and Nazi Col-
laborators (Punishment) Law, 1951, § I (a), which stated:
A person who has committed one of the following offenses - (1) did, during the
period of the Nazi regime, in a hostile country, an act constituting a crime,
against the Jewish people; (2) did, during the period of the Nazi regime, in a
hostile country, an act constituting a crime against humanity; (3) did, during the
period of the Second World War, in a hostile country, an act constituting a war
crime; is liable to the death penalty.
Id., reprinted in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 150, at 841-42.
153. See G. REITLINGER, THE FINAL SOLUTION app. I (1953) (providing a statisti-
cal summary of the Holocaust).
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perception of the so-called "problem" (or the cloaking of hatred in in-
tellectually pretentious garb that the "problem" represents) seriously
for its own sake. However, the history of pre-Nazi nationalist thought
vis-A-vis the Jews helps shed light on the court's conceptualization of
the crime being punished and the symbolic affirmation that the judg-
ment seeks to achieve.
A. EUROPEAN NATIONALISM AND THE "JEWISH PROBLEM"
If the liberal, individual-oriented facet of eighteenth century Euro-
pean political thought, finding its most dramatic expression in the
French Revolution, has a distinctly universalist and integrationist
thrust, the conservative, nation-oriented political theories culminating
in European nationalism exhibit a markedly particularistic and segre-
gationist tendency.-" Indeed, the very point of this school of thought is
to philosophically ground and to politically emphasize the inherent di-
versity among peoples in their distinguishable social identities. As Elie
Kedourie has pointed out, European nationalists started with this prin-
ciple of diversity in the mid-eighteenth century, postulating that "the
differences which distinguish individuals from one another are things
holy," and went on to theorize that universal harmony can be attained
only "through each different species reaching the perfection of its
kind., 55
The cornerstone of national identity, according to the early national-
ist theorists, is language. The conception of an individual was one of
being "no passive spectator in the world," but rather as "actively in-
volved in what he observes or experiences," with language providing
the medium through which he expresses himself and "refer[s] every-
thing to himself."'15 The idea, of course, is that people do not simply
observe and assimilate things and events going on around them, but
that they take part in these happenings and relationships by expressing
their understandings and feelings through words. Thus, people relate to
each other essentially through language and they externalize their
thoughts and feelings and become conscious of themselves and others in
154. Thus, British conservative thinker Edmunde Burke, in his reaction to the polit-
ical theory of the antimonarchial uprising in eighteenth century France, asserted cate-
gorically that it makes no sense to speak of the "rights of man" as did the French
revolutionaries, but rather it is meaningful to speak only of rights as emanating from a
distinct social hierarchy, as in "the rights of the Englishmen." E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS
ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 36 (1955).
155. E. KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM 62 (1960).
156. Id. at 62 (citing HERDER, TREATISE UPON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE (1772)).
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the linguistic exercise of self-expression.15
One evident problem with identifying language as the basis for
human self-consciousness is that not everyone speaks the same lan-
guage. Indeed, the linguistic nationalists went on to postulate that no
person can truly speak more than one language because language was
more than simply a communicative mechanism. Language encom-
passed "the individuality of a people . . . manifest in all of its other
common activities,"15 and so provided for both the source and delinea-
tion of a distinct people. Thus, one German political philosopher of this
school asserted definitively that "we give the name of people to men
whose organs of speech are influenced by the same external conditions,
who live together, and who develop their language in continuous com-
munication with each other."1 59 It was in this sense of linguistic and
cultural affinity, the defining point of social relations, that it could be
said that "the [political] separation of Prussians from the rest of the
Germans is purely artificial . . . [whereas] the separation of the
Germans from the other European nations is based on Nature.9
1 D
As Kedourie points out, the Nazi doctrine of racial nationalism was
grounded on, and essentially indistinguishable from, the earlier linguis-
tic versions. As the racial nationalism theory developed, language was
viewed as peculiar to a nation first for the communicative bonds that it
engendered, then for the cultural commonality for which it stood, and,
finally, for its significance as a symbol of each nation as "a racial stock
distinct from that of other nations." 81 It is interesting that this cul-
tural and racial purity is most frequently defined with reference to its
antithesis, the foreign elements in the midst of an otherwise natural
nation. Typically, the focus shifted from language to race by illustra-
tive reference to the Semite in Europe, a linguistically, culturally, and
racially foreign element in a continent of national peoples.18 2
157. The expressive self-conscious can be juxtaposed against the reflective self-con-
scious espoused by Descartes. See R. DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF
RIGHTLY CONDUCTING TO REASON (E. Haldane & G. Ross trans. 1952) (stating: "I
think, therefore I am"). Thus, one language theorist parodied the Cartesian formula
for self-knowledge, exclaiming "I speak, therefore I am." 1 A. SOREL, L'EUROPE ET LA
REVOLUTION FRANqAISE 429 (1902).
158. F. SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTICS: THE HANDWRITTEN MANUSCRIPTS 163
(J. Duke & J. Forstmen trans. 1977).
159. E. KEDOURIE, supra note 155, at 64 (quoting J. FICHTE, ADDRESSES TO THE
GERMAN NATION (1979)).
160. E. KEDOURIE, supra note 155, at 68 (quoting J. FICHTE, PATRIOTISM AND ITS
OPPOSITE (1807)).
161. E. KEDOURIE, supra note 155, at 71-72.
162. In the words of French nationalist Charles Maurras, the connection between
race and language was exemplified by the "fact" that "no Jew . . . could appreciate
the beauties of Racine's line in Bernice: 'Dans l'orient desert quel devint mon ennui'"
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Denigration of Jews in this individualized identity as persons un-
rooted in their host countries and, thus, incapable of "sinking their own
persons in the greater whole of the nation"16 3 may, therefore, be seen
not as just another point of view in European nationalist politics, but
rather as a defining point in the nationalist consciousness.", Moreover,
this nonentity status in nationalist thought seems to have pursued the
Jews even in their own collective and segregated existence. As Kedourie
explains, "In nationalist doctrine, language, race, culture, and some-
times even religion, constitute different aspects of the same primordial
entity, the nation."165 Of these factors, classical nationalists tended to
perceive the first three as legitimately delineating both the cohesions
and the distinctions that characterize the world of separate nations.
They tended, however, to exclude factors that, although at times as-
serted as a national bond of particular peoples, in fact exhibited a uni-
versalist rather than a truly communitarian thrust. With Christianity
as its model, this mode of thought rejected religion as a properly distin-
guishing, nation-building force.
1 66
With the transnational embrace of Christian theology in mind, Euro-
pean nationalists dismissed the unifying feature of Jewish life as a basis
for national communitarian existence.10 7 As foreigners, the Jewish pres-
Id. at 72.
163. Id. at 73.
164. Echoing sentiment expressed toward his country's Jewish population, German
nationalist Friedrich Schleiermacher exclaimed, "How little worthy of respect is the
man who roams about hither and thither without the anchor of national ideal and love
of fatherland." Id. at 73. See generally J. GAER, THE LEGEND OF THE WANDERING
JEW (1961) (relating the anti-Semitic legend of the Jew condemned for having re-
buffed Jesus to live aimlessly until the second coming).
165. E. KEDOURIE, supra note 155, at 78.
166. Kedourie points to Gennadius, the mid-fifteenth century Patriarch of Constan-
tinople, as illustrating the traditional distinction drawn between ties of language and
race on one hand, and those of religious adherence on the other. Id. at 77. In the
Patriarch's words: "Though I am a Hellene by speech, yet I would never say that I was
a Hellene, for I do not believe as the Hellenes believed. I should like to take my name
from my Faith, and if anyone asked me what I am answer 'Christian." Id.
167. This tendency to exclude Jewish experience from the mainstream of history in
light of the sharp distinction drawn in Christian theological and European political
thought between spiritual and social bonds has continued from the early nationalists to
twentieth century historians. Thus, Toynbee asserts that "it is the supreme irony of
Jewish history that. . . a Galilaean Jewish prophet whose message was the consumma-
tion of all previous Jewish religious experience. . . was then rejected by the Judaean
leaders of Jewry of his own age. Thereby Judaism not only stultified its past but for-
feited its future." A. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 485 (1947).
Ignored in the account, of course, is the Jewish self-conception rooted in the Biblical
notion of covenant: the organizing idea of Jewish communal life, defining "the basis of
political and social relationships among men as well as between man and God." D.
GLAZER, KINSHIP AND CONSENT 21-25 (1983) (examining the conventional basis of
Judaism and its origins dating back to the Bible). Jewish existence as a people apart
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ence in Europe was qualitatively different than the perceived problem
of, for example, Italians residing in France or even of entire German
communities residing outside German political bounds. Caught within
an historical discourse of contradictory denigrations, the Jews were por-
trayed as a foreign racial and linguistic/cultural phenomenon insofar
as the "original" European nations were concerned, and as a religious
(and therefore essentially noncohesive) phenomenon insofar as the pos-
sibility of their own nationhood was concerned. From the nationalist
perspective, nonentityship ultimately came to characterize Jews in both
their individual and their collective capacities.
While the groundwork of the "Jewish problem" was laid by the
eighteenth century linguistic/nationalist theorists, it did not manifest
itself as a subject of intellectual debate until the nineteenth century
liberalization of European society. Promising the triumph of the mar-
ket over extant social hierarchies, the ideology of liberalism captivated
the nineteenth century European mind and recast the old status-based
society in the name of individual social mobility.16 8 As an all-embrac-
ing political ethic, liberalism held particular promise for the Jews. It
not only viewed commercial success (the traditional niche left open to
Jewish endeavor) in a more positive way, but it offered to terminate
both the socially significant role previously played by ethnic identity
and the general social rigidity that led to Jewish ghettoization."'
The attempted accommodation of the ideologies of liberalism and na-
tionalism took the peculiar form of idealizing the emergence of the
modern bureaucratic state, which was to replace the preindustrial or
organic communities of Europe with which the linguistic nationalists
cannot be understood without some comprehension of the insular character of the fused
social/legal and religious covenant-community that Christian scholarship after Paul
seems to have dismissed from history. See S. ROSENBERG, THE CHRISTIAN PROBLEM
101-03 (1986) (noting the Jewish self-government in exile and its adherence to the
Jewish covenant).
168. On this overgeneralized movement from status to individualized relations as
the governing principle of European society, see H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163-65
(1986) (conveying the succession of the European movement as a phase of social order
where the individual is distinguished from the social unit of the family and commu-
nity); H. LASKI, THE RISE OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 270-77 (1936) (describing the
new and ideologized birth and evolution of liberalism in Europe dating back to the
sixteenth century); Wallerstein, Class Formation in the Capitalist World-Economy, 5
POL. & Soc'Y 367, 368 (1975); C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSES-
SIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 1-70 (1962). See generally W. LAQUEUR, THE
HISTORY OF ZIONISM 3-39 (1976) (discussing the European movement and its impact
on European Jewry); Binder, The Dialectic of Duplicity: Treaty Conflict and Political
Contradiction, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 329, 537-42 (1985) (considering the dialectical
history of liberalism and its effect on European Jews).
169. See Binder, supra note 168, at 538-39.
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had been concerned. The newfound need for professionals and a civil
service in the industrialized state combined conveniently with the indi-
vidualized social mobility that liberalism brought about. Nationalist
sentiment was thereby able to continue to flourish even as its original
notions of depersonalization within the social fabric came to be
undermined.170
Against this mid-nineteenth century background of the apparent rec-
onciliation of liberal individualism with the European nation state, Karl
Marx engaged in his renowned speculations with respect to the "Jewish
question" and a market-oriented social life.171 As Marx pointed out,
development of the modern liberal state required the factoring of reli-
gion out of public or "political" life and relegation of religious belief to
the private realm of "civil society." Thus, "members of the political
state" could be religious only in a way that reflected "the dualism be-
tween individual life and species-life. 17 2 Conversely, the constitutional
states of modern Europe still preserved "the appearance of a state reli-
gion . . . in the formula . . . of a religion of the majority," such that
to the European eye, "the relationship of the Jew to the state also re-
tains the appearance of a religious, theological opposition."' 7 3 Thus, the
demand of Jews to participate as both Jew and citizen in public or
political life was immediately problematic.17 '
Marx's point was to show that the nationalist self-consciousness that
permeated European political thought stood in inevitable contradiction
to the tide of liberal theory. Entrance of the publicly identifiable Jew
into the realm of public service would underscore the deterioration of
nationalism in the face of individualism and the market, while denial of
the public participatory capacity of the Jew would emphasize the faulty
base of liberalism built on national communitarian sentiment. Either
way, Jews continued to stand for the dilemma of nonentityship within
the European conceptual world.
Therefore, anti-Semitism, that brand of prejudice so often associated
170. See E. GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 19-52 (1983) (discussing the
combination of nationalism and liberalism, particularly among the newly created mid-
dle class in public service professions).
171. See Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARx-ENGELs READER 26-27, 49
(R. Tucker 2d ed. 1978) (analyzing society's need to emancipate itself from economics
or commerce, which were equated with Judaism).
172. Id. at 39.
173. Id. at 30.
174. Id. at 34. Marx notes: "[Tihe bourgeois, like the Jew, only takes part in the
life of the state in a sophistical way, just as the citoyen only remains a Jew or a bour-
geois in a sophistical way .... The contradiction which exists between religious man
and political man is the same as exists between the bourgeois and the citoyen, between
the member of civil society and his political lion's skin." Id.
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with a lack of erudition or mere callous obstinateness,7 5 captivated the
European mind in even its most sophisticated theoretical musings.71
While unadulterated nationalism excluded Jews from status in either
their individual or community guises, the modern nationalism tempered
by liberal values found it impossible to attribute them with political
stature in the absence of outright assimilation into the secularity of
public life."' Jews are important in the history of European political
thought not for any acknowledgment of their own legitimate existence,
but for the valuable comparison that their very nonexistence seemed to
present to those theorizing about the stature of other European individ-
uals and nations. Historically, the result of all of this for European
Jewry was either a ghetto existence or some form of disappearance.
Adolf Eichmann's solution moved from the former position to the
latter.
B. THE FINAL SOLUTION
As judicial events go, the Eichmann case is as dramatic a case as one
can find. The defendant was not only the biggest Nazi fish to be caught
since the end of the war, but he was brought before the court in a way
that gave the litigation maximum advance billing.1 7 8 Moreover, from
175. See J. SARTRE, ANTI-SEMITE AND JEW 20 (1948) (stating that "the anti-Sem-
ite is impervious to reason and to experience . . . because he has chosen first of all to
be impervious").
176. The victims of European anti-Semitism have, on occasion, expressed amaze-
ment at the apparently sophisticated sources from which their mistreatment has come.
See, e.g., Rabinovich, A Double Drama, Jerusalem Post Int'l Ed., May 14, 1987, at 5,
col. 4 (providing the testimony of Yosef Czarny, a former inmate of Treblinka, in At-
torney General of Israel v. Demjanjuk). This report recounts the daily atrocities of life
in the camp:
'Why did they do this, honorable bench?' asked a sobbing witness, Yosef Czarny,
with an astonishment that seemed as fresh when he testified this week when he
first entered Treblinka as a hasidic youth not yet 16. 'To this day I cannot under-
stand. How could the Germans do this? They are a cultured people.'
Id.
177. See Bauer, The Jewish Problem, in L. STEPELEViCH, THE YOUNG HEoELIANS
187-210 (1983) (discussing the notion that Jews could be accommodated in the liberal
nation-states of Europe only in the event that they stopped being identifiable as Jews).
Marx's polemic was a response to Bauer's work. See Marx, supra note 171, at 26
(stating, "[w]e do not tell the Jews that they cannot be emancipated politically without
radically emancipating themselves from Judaism, which is what Bauer tells them").
178. This essay does not delve into the merits of the defense's allegations that the
abduction of Eichmann from Argentina was a violation of international law, which
rendered the subsequent trial invalid. It seems sufficient in this regard to simply cite
the district court's acknowledgement of the Security Council Resolution 138 that called
on the two countries to agree to some means of repairing Argentina's injured sover-
eignty, and to take note of the joint communique Israel and Argentina issued on Au-
gust 3, 1960 in which the countries announced a settlement of the dispute. S.C. Res.
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the very outset of the process the decision's retributive message prom-
ised to be particularly evocative in both its content and its (albeit for-
mally legal) tone. While the stage was set for regurgitating a
nightmare, the actual scenery and courtroom props bespoke the realiza-
tion of a dream.179 Although the case concentrated on condemning the
Third Reich's ultimate approach to Europe's historic "Jewish prob-
lem," the very fact and location of the trial suggested the materializa-
tion of an alternative and equally final solution.
The court's response to the defendant's jurisdictional challenge
moved in two seemingly contradictory directions. The judgment articu-
lates two distinct grounds for its adjudicative authority over the defend-
ant and his crimes. One asserts that criminal jurisdiction could be exer-
cised by absolutely everyone and the other implies that such
judgmental capacity is not for just anyone. These two grounds of legal
authority, in turn, stand for the deep-seated duality that the substan-
tive Nazi offenses were felt to represent: the affront to personality in
both the rationally autonomous and the emotionally bonded sense.
As a preliminary jurisdictional matter, the court referred to the in-
ternationalist logic of the Nuremberg case. The decision indicated that
the genocidal acts "struck at the whole of mankind," and that, there-
fore, they constituted "grave offenses against the law of nations itself"
and require "the judicial and legislative organs of every country to...
bring the criminals to trial."18 0 Thus, the court in Eichmann in the first
instance simply takes the notion of an international systemic judgment
one step further, implementing in a literal fashion the process demands
of a horizontal legal system. Once again, Nazi crimes are perceived as
138, 11 U.N. SCOR (865th mtg.) at 2526, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). Eichmann in
HARRIS, supra note 148, at 252. In addition, the court cited its own domestic doctrine
of legislative supremacy in overriding the international legal claim and found further
support for the position in international doctrine itself. See 4 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 597, at 311 (1970) (stating that a kidnapped fugitive cannot
"set up in answer to the indictment the unlawful manner in which he was brought
within the jurisdiction of the court"). Moore further stated, "[ilt belongs exclusively to
the government from whose territory he was wrongfully taken to complain of the viola-
tion of its rights." Id.; see also Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886) (holding that
obtaining custody in violation of a United States-Peru extradition treaty does not vio-
late a defendant's constitutional rights). These pronouncements evidence the rhetorical
displacement of transcendant individual rights in favor of sovereign consent. See supra
notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of sovereign consent
displacing individual rights).
179. Theodore Herzl has been described as having written his Judenstat, the inspi-
rational work of the modern Zionist movement, "[fleverishly, as if in a trance." M.
MARGOLIS & A. MARX, A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 703 (1972).
180. Eichmann in HARRIS, supra note 148, at 224.
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having "no geographic location";181 having been committed against any
conceivable collection of people, they consequently fall within any con-
ceivable jurisdiction.8 2 Accordingly, this version of the adjudicative
drama vindicates the universal rationality of persons and celebrates the
autonomous, personal freedom of abstract right.
The court's second authoritative assertion was more particular in na-
ture. This ground of legal power, based on a domestic Israeli statute,183
was characterized as flowing from "the right. . .[of] the victim nation
• ..to try any who assault its existence.' 8 4 Again, the court acknowl-
edged that the "victims' jurisdiction" can be conceived in two alterna-
tive ways. The first of these brings The S.S. Lotus to mind,80 and
presents the legitimacy of such judicial authority in what might be de-
scribed as a negative way. In this view, the transnational normative
system is characterized essentially by liberty, each state being free to
try crimes in the absence of "a specific rule in international law which
negates that power."188
In view of the positive quality of the retributive message, however,
the court was anxious to place its most evocative jurisdictional ground
in a more affirmative light. Indeed, one need not read too deeply into
the case to realize that the essence of a "victims' jurisdiction" is not to
confirm that adjudicative power is open to the entire world, but rather
to assert the special place of one community over others.181 Here the
issue is not so much the personhood of the individual victims as it is the
181. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text (discussing the phrase "no
geographic location" as it appears in the Nuremberg Charter).
182. The court indicated that in the absence of an international tribunal such as
that which existed in Nuremberg or that envisioned under the Convention On the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, any state that apprehends a Nazi
fugitive would be in a position similar to that of a coastal state apprehending a pirate.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, art. 6,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280-82, reprinted in Official Document Supplement, 45 AM. J. INT'L
L. 7, 8 (1951) (establishing an international penal tribunal). Similarly, the situation is
said to be comparable to that of the Northern Italian city-states of the Middle Ages
with respect to roving criminals such as "banniti, vagabundi, assassini," over whom
universal jurisdiction was asserted. Eichmann in HARRIS, supra note 148, at 225.
183. Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 1951 § 1(a), reprinted in H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 150, at 841-42 (referring to "crimes against the
Jewish people").
184. Eichmann in HARRIS, supra note 148, at 226.
185. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). See
generally Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935) (discussing the general acceptability of such
jurisdiction in international law doctrine).
186. Eichmann in HARRIS, supra note 148, at 227.
187. Id. The court declared: "[T]he 'linking point' between Israel and the accused
...is striking in the case of 'crime against the Jewish people,' a crime that postulates
the intention to exterminate the Jewish people in whole or in part." Id.
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peoplehood of the Jews in their collective, emotionally bonded, and dis-
tinct national essence. To this effect, the court affirmatively declared
that "[a] people which can be murdered with impunity lives in danger,
to say nothing of its 1honour and authority.' "188 While Eichmann's
crimes expressed the inconsequentiality of Jewish existence, the redress
of these crimes vindicated the authority and symbolically expressed the
communal connectedness and the insular distinctiveness of Jewish na-
tional life.' 89
To return momentarily to Europe's historic "Jewish problem," the
Jewish embrace of individualism as an emancipatory exit from the
ghetto emphasized for Europeans the incompatibility between the new
ethic and the ingrained ethos of nationalism.190 With an acceleration of
anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth century, dramatically culminating
in what was for Herzl the inspirational Dreyfus affair,19' the idea of
Jewish emancipation turned from liberalism to an ideology of national-
ism strikingly similar to the European movements from which they had
historically been excluded. 92 In a sense, the Zionist idea combined the
twin negative experiences of ghettoization and assimilation into an af-
firmative new mix, urging both communal segregation and the disap-
pearance of Jews from the European scene through emigration into a
sovereignty of their own.' 93
188. Id.
189. The court reiterated a central theme in the retributive message in stating that
although the codification of the offenses under which the defendant was charged were
drafted with retroactive effect, their intended significance was aimed at the present
rather than the past. Id. The court postulated:
This Law was enacted in 1950, to be applied to a specified period which had
terminated five years before its enactment. The protected interests of the State
recognized by the protective principle is in this case the interest existing at the
time of the enactment of the Law, and we have already dwelt on the importance
of the moral and defensive task which this Law is designed to fulfill ....
Id.
190. See A. HERTZBERG, THE ZIONIST IDEA 21-32 (1972) (discussing the Jewish
emancipation and liberal values).
191. On October 15, 1894, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish military officer attached to the
French general staff, was charged with treason against France. M. MARGOUS & A.
MARX, supra note 179, at 703. The resulting case galvanized French public opinion for
and against not only Dreyfus, but with respect to the place of Jews in French society.
Id. Theodore Herzl, then a Paris resident and correspondent of a Vienna newspaper,
was apparently so moved by the events as to overcome his formerly meager interest in
the co-religionists of his birth, allowing "the Jewish question [to] preoccup[y] his
thoughts, and it presented itself to him neither as an economic nor as a religious, but as
a political and national one." Id.
192. See Binder, supra note 168, at 537 (stating, "one nationalism begets
another").
193. See W. LAQUEUR, supra note 168, at 84-135, 193 (relating the origins of the
Zionist political movement).
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In asserting its "victims' jurisdiction," the Eichmann court deployed
in argument the "protective principle" on which the English courts
have rationalized the exercise of jurisdiction over various treasonous
acts."" To assert the "protective principle" the court had to address the
argument that the defendant's acts predated the creation of the state
whose protection was being invoked. The court first detailed the ele-
ments of the defendant's genocidal solution to the problem of the Jews
in Europe, and then conceptually assimilated the jurisdiction on behalf
of the victims to a jurisdiction on behalf of the state, all of which made
sense without further elaboration to an audience familiar with the his-
tory of the "Jewish problem" and its ultimate political solution. 190 The
nonentityship of the Jews in the eyes of European nationalists had fi-
nally been turned on its head.
This, then, represents the final message of the Eichmann drama.
While in a preliminary way the rational personhood and equality of
every Jew with every one of her historical detractors is affirmed, the
most evocative theme is that of the positive capacity of the Jews to
bond into distinct nationhood. Not just Jews, but the Jewish nation, is
symbolically placed on par with the nation(s) that has been its nemesis,
as Europe's ultimate nationalist bureaucrat is made to answer to the
authority of Jewish courts. In the end, therefore, the case is not (only)
a vindication of 6 million lives lost, but a poignant celebration of Jew-
ish sovereignty at last achieved.196 It is the fitting response to a history
in which Jews were denied stature in their personal capacities as
human beings and, perhaps more to the point, in their collective capac-
ity as a people.
III. Demjanjuk : "This is the bread of affliction .... ,,197
In November 1983, after more than twenty years of judicial silence
194. Eichmann in HARRIS, supra note 148, at 226 (citing Joyce v. Director of Pub-
lic Prosecutions [1946] A.C. 347, (which held a dual British-American citizen guilty of
treason under British law for propaganda broadcasts on behalf of Germany during
World War II).
195. Id. at 227. In a single sentence the court declared, "[t]he connection between
the State of Israel and the Jewish people needs no explanation." Id. In this sense, the
case provides graphic illustration of Foucault's observation that, "[b]roadly speaking
... punishment is a ceremonial of sovereignty." M. FOuCAULT, supra note 2, at 130.
196. Sovereignty, of course, is portrayed as the formal realization of historic na-
tionhood. In the words of the Haggadah, "Israel became a distinct nation in Egypt,"
prior to the return to the promised land. HAGGADAR, supra note 1, at 12.
197. HAGGADAH, supra note 1, at 8. The opening paragraph of the Passover Story
states:
This is the bread of affliction which our forefathers ate in the land of Egypt. All
who are hungry - let them come and eat. All who are needy - let them come
[VOL.. 3:1
RETRIBUTORY THEATRE
on the question of war criminals, John Demjanjuk, a Ukranian by birth
and resident of the Cleveland suburb of Parma, Ohio since the end of
World War II, was arrested at the request of the government of
Israel. 198 After hearings at three levels of the United States federal
courts, Demjanjuk was extradited in February 1986.100 It was the first
extradition request that Israel had made regarding a Nazi-era criminal,
and the first major trial of a Holocaust perpetrator in the twenty-five
years since the Eichmann case.2"' Unlike the dimunitive and cerebral
architect of the "final solution," however, the six-foot tall, overweight
Demjanjuk did not conjur memories of the grand, psuedo-scientific
Nazi scheme. Rather, he was accused and convicted 20 1 of being the
sadistic Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka, who "all too enthusiastically
ran the. . . gas chambers, taking it upon himself to mutilate and whip
the naked throngs of Jews to hurry them into death."20 2
Although the Demjanjuk case commenced amidst an upsurge of in-
terest and litigious activity,203 war crimes trials have become and will
and celebrate the Passover with us. Now we are here; next year may we be in the
Land of Israel. Now we are slaves, next year may we be free men.
Id.
198. Kessel, Israel, in a Test Case. Seeks to Extradite Suspected Nazi War Crimi-
nal from U.S., Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1983, at 16, col. I.
199. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'g 612 F. Supp. 571
(N.D. Ohio 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
200. The only prosecutions under Israel's Nazi and Nazi collaborators (Punish-
ment) Law, 1951, had been of Eichmann himself and several "kapos," or Jewish col-
laborators who had become citizens of Israel. Lubet & Redd, Extradition of Nazis
from the United States to Israel: A Survey of Issues in Transnational Criminal Law,
22 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1986).
201. See Rabin, Israeli Court Convicts Demjanjuk of Atrocities at Treblinka
Camp, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at Al, col. 2 (reporting the unanimous judgment of
April 18, 1988 in which Demjanjuk was convicted of four counts of "crimes against the
Jewish people, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against a persecuted
people").
202. Clines, Once Again into that Ashen Night of History, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1987, at E3, col. I [hereinafter Clines, Once Again]. The defendant is described as
"shambl[ing] onto the stage each morning with, as audience members invariably note,
the physical look of a central casting Nazi thug." Id.
203. Whereas Nazis and the war years have long been a favorite topic of the film
industry, the success of Claude Lantzmann's Shoah is unique insofar as it focuses on
the tragedy of European Jewry rather than the war itself. Berlin Film Festival Screens
"'Shoah," N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1986, at C15, col. 1. For further evidence of this phe-
nomenon, see Weintraub, Reagan to Visit German Graves, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1985,
at Al, col. 1 (describing the controversy surrounding President Reagan's August 1986
visit to the German military cemetery at Bittburg); Markham, Elie Wiesel Gets Nobel
for Peace as 'Messenger,' N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, at Al, col. 2 (discussing the
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Holocaust writer Elie Wiesel).
In the legal world, war criminal defendants have begun making appearances in the
courts of a number of different countries. Romanian "Iron Guard" member Bishop
Valerian Trifa was stripped of his United States citizenship. United States v. Trifa,
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doubtless remain rarified events, as the counting of time since the Eu-
ropean death camps has shifted from years to decades to generations." 4
In view of the roles played by past war crimes defendants and the re-
tributory drama presented by past decisions, the prosecution of
Demjanjuk raised at least a threshold question of purpose. That is, the
difficult theoretical questions of substance and process, the complex
meanings of punishment, and the vindication of persons and peoples
involved in the receding events were so thoroughly canvassed in Nu-
remberg and Eichmann that their repetition at first might seem need-
lessly painful.20 5 Furthermore, the case itself is a judicial event that
from its inception promised to raise no controversial issue other than
the factual one of the defendant's identity. Finally, it seems particu-
larly ironic that this physically oversized defendant, who was by all
accounts a brutal but peculiarly "small cog" in the Nazi wheel, 00
should follow twenty-five years of silence in the Jewish courts since the
1961 conviction of the physically petit genocidal grandmaster. At this
point, as one Israeli news magazine asked in bold headlines at the be-
ginning of the Demjanjuk proceedings: "Who Cares?"
207
662 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982). Klaus Barbie,
former Gestapo chief of Lyon, France was extradited from Bolivia to France, and con-
victed by a French court for crimes against humanity. A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS,
273-79 (1984); see also Bernstein, French Court Finds Barbie Guilty and Orders him
to Prison for Life, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1987, at Al, col. 4 (describing the conviction of
Barbie and his sentence of life imprisonment). Former S.S. member Helmut Rauca
was extradited from Canada to West Germany. Federal Republic of Germany v.
Rauca, 41 O.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A. 1983). Karl Linnas was deported from the United
States to the Soviet Union to face charges of war crimes in his native Latvia. Linnas v.
I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3393, 107 S. Ct. 600
(1986).
204. Newspaper accounts of the Demjanjuk trial, which commenced in the Jerusa-
lem District Court in February 1987, emphasized the fact that, while the prosecution
witnesses tended to be septuagenarians, the majority of the audience for the televised
proceedings was born after the cremation of Adolf Eichmann. See e.g., Rabinovich,
supra note 176, at 5, col. 4 (stating that "[t]he principal objective of the government in
extraditing Demjanjuk from the United States, apart from justice, was to make the
Holocaust real to the younger generation").
205. This opinion was expressed by substantial sectors of the Israeli public at the
commencement of the trial. Clines, Israel Opens Case in Death Camp Trial, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1987, at A3, col. 4 [hereinafter Clines, Israel Opens Case]. This atti-
tude, however, seems to have ended rather quickly as "the public apathy and empty
rows of seats that marked the first days of the Demjanjuk trial [gave] way to spectators
camping overnight outside the entrance in order to ensure themselves a place." Rabi-
novich, supra note 176, at 5, col. 4.
206. Meyer, Demjanjuk On Trial, Jerusalem Post Int'l Ed., May 14, 1987, at 5,
col. I (describing the defendant as a "small cog" prone to extreme sadism).
207. Clines, Once Again, supra note 202, at E3, col. 1.
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A. THE LESSON: RELIVING OPPRESSION
The Demjanjuk trial commenced with an acknowledgement by the
defendant of both his local audience and his international viewers.
Thus, the man accused of being the former Ivan the Terrible of the
Treblinka death camp entered the Jerusalem courtroom on the first day
with a resounding Hebrew "boker tov" (good morning) and, in English,
a showman-like "Hello, Cleveland!" 208 In these facile expressions, with
all of their connotations of a dark past hiding under a present buffoon-
ery, resides the first part of an answer to the troubling question of the
case's meaningfulness. It is in the cognizance of audience, the aware-
ness by all parties concerned that war crimes trials are nothing if not a
spectator sport,209 that the Demjanjuk litigation began to make sense.
First and foremost in this respect is the "history lesson" aspect of the
case. Much has been made of the live television coverage that the Israel
broadcasting network provided for the trial, and the manner in which
Israeli high school classrooms became engaged in the replay of history
that unfolded with the case. 10 Indeed, Demjanjuk's defense counsel
commented in his opening statement that the actual criminal proceed-
ings faced by his client, the trial of identification on which the defend-
ant's life can quite literally be said to have turned "is far less important
than the historical trial."'
Notwithstanding Demjanjuk's own apparent inconsequentiality, the
particular role he was alleged to have played in the overall Holocaust
scheme, for all of its narrowness, has become central to the lesson it-
self. While the excesses of Nazism are grasped by most of the world in
the abstract, there have been few, if any, comparable occasions for
graphically depicting the way in which the genocide unfolded on a
daily basis. Thus, where Eichmann acknowledged that the numbers
may have reached somewhere in the incomprehensible range of six mil-
lion people, the Demjanjuk prosecutor promised to bring home the pic-
ture of how "[d]ay in, day out, hundreds of Jews naked as the day they
were born were pushed into the chambers, forced down a path known
208. Clines, Israel Opens Case, supra note 205, at A3, col. 4.
209. Meyer, Hall Prepared for Demjanjuk Trial, Jerusalem Post Int'l Ed., Feb.
21, 1987, at 4, col. 3. A theater building was converted into a courtroom for the
Demjanjuk trial, with an elevated bench for the panel of three judges and a box for the
accused set up on the stage. Id.
210. Watzman, Not a Show Trial, Jerusalem Post Int'l Ed., Mar. 28, 1987, at 5,
col. 3. Much like the Demjanjuk "history lesson," the concurrent trial of Klaus Barbie
in Lyons, France has been dubbed a "morality play in which everyman meets the Devil
and survives." Morgan, Voices from the Barbie Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1987, § 6
(Magazine), at 8, col. 1.
211. Rabinovich, supra note 176, at 5, col. 4.
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as the 'road to heaven.' "212 From the audience's point of view, not only
does the Demjanjuk story provide a living textbook of events, 213 it nar-
rates the historical drama on a judicially unprecedented personal
level.214 In keeping with the character of the brutish Ivan, there is no
speculation with respect to the intellectual sources of anti-Semitism, or
the politics of the war years in his native Ukraine.215 Rather, the tran-
scripts of the prosecution's case bear remarkable resemblance to the
Holocaust literary chronicles of Elie Wiesel.216 The story unfolds as a
tale of 900,000 individual tragedies at the Treblinka camp,217 and ac-
cordingly presents a startlingly unique and intensely personalized per-
spective on an episode in history whose actual details had almost come
to be taken for granted within the abstract evil represented by the
212. Clines, Israel Opens Case, supra note 205, at A3, col. 4.
213. Friedman, Treblinka Becomes an Israeli Obsession, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,
1987, at Al, col. 1. In response to the trial, Israeli high school student Zvi Weiss stated
that "[o]ur generation bears the responsibility to go and listen to this, because from
here on it is only going to be textbooks." Id.
214. Id. Israel Foreign Ministry spokesman Ehud Gol stated:
I'm waiting to take my eleven year-old daughter on a day when one of the survi-
vors testifies. I want her to hear something that she'll never forget for the rest of
her life, so that 30 or 40 years from now when her children come to her and ask
what happened, she'll have an answer.
Id.
215. Meyer, Trial of John Demjanjuk, Jerusalem Post Int'l Ed., Feb. 28, 1987, at
3, col. 1. The prosecution's case did include, however, testimony by historians as expert
witnesses. Id. Dr. Yitzhak Arad, Director of the Yad Vashem Holocaust Remembrance
Authority, spent the second day of the trial
unravell[ing] the grisly story of the almost total extermination of East European
Jewry by the Germans . . . . Saying that Treblinka was the largest cemetery of
Polish Jewry, . . . Arad outlined and described the major steps that led to the
setting up of the extermination camps, as distinct from concentration camps, of
which Treblinka was the largest.
Id. Similarly, Demjanjuk's lawyers opened his defense with an historical account of
Soviet-Ukrainian animosity in support of the contention that the defendant's associa-
tion with the Nazi regime was first as a prisoner of war, and then later, as a member of
an anti-Soviet Ukrainian army, which fought alongside the Germans. Friedman,
Demjanjuk on the Stand: Denies Guilt, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, at A3, col. 2.
216. WIESEL, supra note 9. Wiesel's works center around the plight of millions of
individuals who remained tragically ignorant of the total Nazi scheme. Id.; see id. at
20 (describing the extraordinarily personal account of his own family's fate). Wiesel
remembers his father's reaction to the requirement that all Jews must wear the yellow
star: "[t]he yellow star? Oh well, what of it? You don't die of it .... " Id. Wiesel
recounts: "Poor Father! Of what then did you die?" Id. at 21.
217. Meyer, supra note 215, at 3, col. 1. In testimony, Yitzhak Arad indicated that
a total of 870,000 Jews had been killed at Treblinka. Id. Other estimates have ranged
from 700,000 to 1,200,000. Id. Arad also pointed out that "on a record day" Ivan
would have pushed approximately 11,000 to 12,000 victims through the entrance to the
gas chambers. Id. See generally Y. ARAD, BELZEC, SOBIBOR, TREBLINKA (1987) (en-
gaging in a full history of the approximately 1,650,000 deaths to have taken place at




Perhaps the testimony of one witness, former Treblinka inmate
Eliyahu Rosenberg, suffices to illustrate the particular flavor of the
educational message contained within this adjudicative enterprise. Al-
though Rosenberg does not purport to speculate on the great themes of
world history, he is both instructive in the information he conveys and
reflective in the questions he asks. Needless to say, it is not for the face
value of the information that his recounting, in a monotone, of the fact
that "the bodies of women and children ... for some reason .. .
burned better than those of men"21 conveys a valuable message to the
listener. Rather, the significance is in the capacity of eyewitness narra-
tors to bring such grotesque tales to life for an audience still incredu-
lous after forty years. Likewise, the very imponderability of the ques-
tions that witnesses like Rosenberg evoke remains with the listener long
after the effects of meticulously documented, but detached histories of
the Nazi era have worn off. Thus, Rosenberg ended a graphic descrip-
tion of Ivan's penchant for mutilating his soon-to-be-gassed victims
with the haunting questions: "I can understand beatings . . . but why
this cutting of living flesh . . .How could he do it?"
220
The key to this microperspective on history, this outpouring of par-
ticular memories and personal experience, is the identity defense. 21
218. This point seems to have been acknowledged early in the proceedings by Chief
Judge Doe Levin, who found that personal accounts of Treblinka were admissible. See
Clines, Israel Opens Case, supra note 205, at A3, col. 4 (discussing Judge Levin's
conclusion that the full story of Treblinka needed to be heard). "'You cannot take it
for granted,' [Judge Levin] said as he ruled that the prosecution could offer a detailed
presentation of the camp's history and the testimony of some of the camp's few survi-
vors." Id.; see also Friedman, supra note 213, at A8, col. 1 (discussing the riveting
quality of the gruesome acts attributed to Ivan). Friedman reports:
What makes this trial all the more compelling is that unlike Eichmann, who was
a bureaucrat charged with responsibility for the murder of six million people -
a crime so enormous that the human mind can barely encompass it - the guard
known as Ivan the Terrible was responsible for killing specific individuals in the
most grotesque fashion with his own hands.
Id.
219. Friedman, supra note 213, at A8, col. 1.
220. Rabinovich, supra note 176, at 5, col. 4.
221. Meyer, supra note 215, at 3, col. I. Demjanjuk's lawyer informed the judge
that he would continue his argument because no evidence existed as to the identity of
the accused. Id. Demjanjuk's lawyer also indicated that although there was some argu-
ment as to the legitimacy of Israel's jurisdiction over the defendant in international
law, the focus of his case would be on the assertion: "my client is not that human
animal, Ivan Grozny (the Terrible). I defend my client against Ivan Grozny." Id.; see
also Schofield, Was Never in Death Camp Demjanjuk Testifies at Trial, Toronto
Globe & Mail, July 28, 1987, at A11, col. I (discussing Demjanjuk's plea to the jury).
At one point, Demjanjuk cried, "[p]lease believe me and don't try to put a rope around
my neck for something someone else has done." During the trial, Demjanjuk blurted
out: "I am not the hangman or henchman you are thinking of. I was never at Treblinka
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Unlike other forums in which World War II policies and atrocities
have come under scrutiny, the Demjanjuk case offers neither apology
nor debate. The defense is in no way premised on the "superior orders"
of a supposed stooge, nor does it entail any element of Holocaust denial
of neo-Nazi ideology. Rather, the entire litigation turns on the question
of the defendant's identification: is he Treblinka's Ivan? 222 Accordingly,
the case mounted by the prosecution (and countered by the defense)
maintains a purely factual approach. In addition to some documentary
evidence (a rare S.S. identity card dated 1942 in the name of Ivan
Demjanjuk, with a description and picture of the defendant) and the
accompanying forensic and historical expertise,223 the trial transcripts
consist primarily of the memories of those who were there and who
somehow survived to tell.
The historical narrative, therefore, is charged with the personal re-
membrances of people whose own individual struggles, like those of
Thomas Hardy's 224 tragic characters, are both all-consuming and insig-
nificant in the greater scheme of a history that they were powerless to
alter or totally comprehend. The lesson, however, is all the more valua-
ble for this powerlessness of the witnesses/victims. The judicial forum
provides for the ultimate empowerment of the prosecution witnesses,
transforming in a striking way the silence that greeted the victims226
into a secular voice of understanding and conscience.22  The point is
or Sobibor. Since the beginning of this trial I have been sitting looking at the shadow
of the accursed Treblinka." Friedman, supra note 215, at A3, col. 1.
222. Friedman, supra note 215, at A3, col. 1. Demjanjuk repeatedly testified that
he was not the accused: "I am accused of being at Treblinka ... but I was never at
Treblinka, or Sobibor, or Trawniki, or any other such place." Id.
223. See id. (discussing the testimony of Holocaust historian Wolfgang Scheffmer on
the accuracy of the details found in the 1942 card identifying Ivan Demjanjuk as an
S.S. concentration camp guard trainee at Trawniki, supplied to the prosecution by the
Soviet Government from its war archives).
224. See generally T. HARDY, THE MAYOR OF CASTERBRIDGE (1886) (describing
the effects of a series of tragic events on the lives of English townsfolk with lessons of
futility and struggle against historical fate and human nature).
225. The incomprehensible silence of both God and humanity is at the thematic
core of much Holocaust literature. For example, Wiesel states:
As a boy. . . I became the disciple of a kabbalist [mystic]. Every night at mid-
night, he would arise to put a handful of ashes on his brow; in a low voice, seated
on the ground, he would lament the destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem...
I was young then and could not imagine that the Temple would soon be de-
stroyed six million times, that the suffering of God could never - never - be
compared to that of the Jewish children who were already being sent to the pyre
while the world remained silent, as silent as he who is judged to be its creator.
Wiesel, The Last Return, in LEGENDS OF OUR TIME 113-14 (1968).
226. It is interesting to compare Wiesel's continued sensation of powerlessness in
addressing the same thoughts not to mankind, but to God. Id. at 7. In reaction to his
teacher's death, Wiesel concluded: "[a]ll things considered, I think that tomorrow I
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not to change events or even to inform the audience of the decimation
of European Jewish life and other large tides of history, but rather to
narrate the insights into human nature that the wartime Jewish experi-
ence - the personal confrontation with the most inhuman behavior
that one could imagine - so dramatically provides. 2
B. THE NARRATION: RELIEVING OPPRESSION
While the prosecution witness' reliving of the personal agonies of the
war years is uniquely informative for the court and its audience, the
effect of the proceedings on its participants ultimately counts as its
most valuable element. First, the trial itself constitutes an implicit at-
tribution of human rationality and the concordant restoration of dignity
to even the inhuman Ivan. In this respect, Demjanjuk's actual identity
is accentuated in its meaninglessness, the dramatic point being that no
accusation of inhumanity can effectively be expressed in a setting that
is contradictory to the vindication of human freedom that the retelling
of the events affirms. As one Israeli scholar has noted, it is the very
formalism of the judicial setting that separates the desire to punish
Ivan from Ivan's own degradation of his victims. Notwithstanding the
excruciating lessons of the testimony, the message is: "No. We are not
going to just go out and kill Demjanjuk.
'2 28
In one sense, therefore, the judicial spectacle restored Ivan's human-
ity, regardless of whether John Demjanjuk was correctly identified.
220
The purpose of the exercise is not to dehumanize an historic villain, but
to take seriously the capacity for rationality that even a death camp
guard demands.2 30 While the history lesson aspect of the trial informed
shall go to the synagogue after all. I will light the candles, I will say Kaddish, and it
will be for me a further proof of my impotence." Id.
227. This sentiment perhaps reflects that often attributed to Wiesel himself, and
which is said to provide the point of distinction between his literary portraits of human
nature and those of other authors. See F. Mauriac, jacket Description to E. WIESEL,
THE GATES OF THE FOREST (F. Frenaye trans. 1966) (stating that "[w]hat gives Elie
Wiesel a unique place among all the novelists of his generation is that while all others
have experienced life, he alone has experienced death").
228. See Friedman, supra note 213, at Al, col. 1, (interviewing Professor David
Hartman, Director of Shalom Hartman Institute for Advanced Judaic Studies).
229. In this sense, the defense counsel is correct in asserting that the recounting of
history in the judicial setting has overshadowed the question of identity posed by the
defendant himself. See Clines, Defense Ridicules Israeli Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
1987, at A3, col. 2. (stating that the defense denounced the proceeding as a "show
trial" aimed at establishing the guilt of Ivan rather than of Demjanjuk).
230. It has been previously noted that Lon Fuller's observation that sense percep-
tions alone cannot give meaning to even the simplest human actions is particularly
applicable to judicial phenomena and goes a long way to distinguishing between retri-
bution and revenge. Fuller, Human Purposes and Natural Law, 3 NAT. L.F. 68, 70
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us of the existence of an animal named Ivan, the forum itself and the
deliberations over the gruesome narration inform Ivan (whoever and
wherever he is) that he is after all a man.
The most important message of the trial, however, is addressed
neither to Ivan the Terrible, nor to the audience at large, but to the
victims themselves. In describing dramatically, but with the full propri-
ety and attention commanded by the witness box, the nightmarish
events that occurred (what now seems to be) a lifetime ago, the victims
are given another chance to purge the past and celebrate its having
passed. Although no passage of time could erase for witness Pinhas
Epstein the memory of his younger brother's murder while standing
next to him in line at their arrival at Treblinka, or the whimpering of
two babies lying alive at the bottom of a pit serving as a mass grave,
231
the mere narration of the forty year-old scenes to a sobbing courtroom
audience was quite evidently cathartic in its effect and liberating in its
message.
23 2
Like the annual retelling of the enslavement and exodus of ancient
Israel, there is a celebratory quality, a reminder of present freedom, in
the recapitulation of the oppressions of the past. As the Demjanjuk
case illustrates, it is primarily the prosecution witnesses who are
availed by the judicial theater of the opportunity to once again narrate
the sequence of past oppressions. Ultimately, therefore, it is the narra-
tors themselves that represent both the subjects and the objects of the
celebration. No account of a trial like that of Demjanjuk could be com-
plete without acknowledgement of the desperate need of Ivan's victims
to tell a story, not of the S.S. or of their Ukrainian guards, but of
themselves. After all, it is their personhood that is at the thematic core
of the war crimes case.
(1958); see also Brudner, supra note 12, at 350 (inferring that actions under the guise
of legal propriety, e.g., a judicial hanging, can be physically identical to those that
represent their antithesis, e.g., a lynching).
231. Meyer, Nazi Hunter Friedman Will Appear for Defence, Jerusalem Post Int'l
Ed., Mar. 7, 1987, at 3, col. 1. This report states: "[Epstein] described how he was told
to take an old woman to the sick-bay - but on arrival there she was taken to the edge
of a pit and shot. 'I saw two babies at the bottom of that pit, in which a fire was
burning. I can hear their whimpering to this day.'" Id.
232. Id. At one point during Epstein's testimony regarding a twelve year-old girl
who came out of the gas chamber alive and crying for her mother, there was sobbing in
the courtroom and Epstein himself is reported to have almost broken down before going
on to tell of the girl's horrific final moments. Id.; see also A. BOAL, THE THEATRE OF
THE OPPRESSED 46 (C. McBride & M. McBride trans. 1979) (describing the catharsis
of the tragic hero in Aristotelian drama and the identification of the audience with this
introspective purging); M. CARLSON, supra note 2, at 475 (stating that "Itihe specta-




The point is perhaps best illustrated through the story of eighty-six
year-old Treblinka survivor, Gustav Boraks, who testified in his native
Yiddish.233 The elderly witness' recollection of events was clearly a dif-
ficult matter. Indeed, in response to cross-examination with respect to
testimony he had provided at Demjanjuk's extradition hearing in the
United States, Boraks responded that he remembered travelling from
Israel to America and that he had gone there by train - eliciting a
gasp from the courtroom audience."' In what might be the saddest
moment of the trial, Boraks at one point halted in his narration of war-
time experiences prior to and during his months at Treblinka, appar-
ently unable to remember the name of his youngest son, Yosef, who
was killed by the Nazis. Suddenly, however, the name came back to
him - revived memory imparting relief. "I didn't forget!" he defiantly
told the bench.235
As Mr. Boraks was helped out of his chair at the end of his court
appearance, Chief Judge Dov Levin wished him a long life. His testi-
mony quite evidently had a double value. From the spectators' point of
view, it is as important to have learned about the existence of Yosef as
it is to have learned about the existence of Ivan. Just as the descrip-
tions of Ivan's cruelty bring home the Nazi essence in a way that de-
scriptions of Eichmann's efficiency do not, so the attributing of faces
and names to the six million victims puts the entire Holocaust in an
altogether new light. What is even more important, however, and what
Judge Levin seems to have captured in his simple salutation, is that the
Demjanjuk case has constituted a forum in which the dignity of the
victims lives can in a formal and dramatic way be affirmed. In the final
analysis, the case is truly significant because it provided Mr. Boraks
himself with the opportunity to once more remember and tell us of
Yosef.
CONCLUSION
Looking back over the more than forty years since the end of the
Nazi era and examining not the history itself, but the dramatic ac-
counts that war crimes cases have produced, one can see that the the-
matic movement has been from the general to the particular. The
ghastly events are first dramatized at Nuremberg, where the narration
of doctrine and, more to the point, of a vision of freedom in personhood
and peoplehood is as different from other expressions of criminal and
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international process as was the "night" being described from other of-
fensive acts. Then, in Eichmann, the enslavement of a people by their
neighbors, the juridical and literal disappearance of the Jews from Eu-
rope's terrain, is portrayed on a stage whose very existence celebrates
the exodus into free nationhood. Finally, and almost as an epilogue to
the more generalized themes of the prior cases, the Demjanjuk trial
presents in a most dramatic way the highly particularized afflictions
and personal remembrances of those for whom relief from past oppres-
sion comes through retelling rather than forgetting.
It is the audience, not just the actors in the dramas, that must ulti-
mately be spun into the web of freedom for which the repetitive narra-
tion of war crimes symbolically stand. Although each case restates the
message with its own peculiar twist, it is in the very restatement to an
engaged audience that the celebrational quality of the narratives is
evoked. The progressive shifting of focus - from the vindication of
humanity and condemnation of a nation, to the acknowledgment of a
nation and the denial of its detractors, to the liberation of individuals
from their torturers - constitutes a sequential revelation of the multi-
ple facets of affliction and relief. In the end, however, this overall move-
ment from general to particular is significant as much for the ceremo-
nial repetition that it allows as for the progressively new perspectives
that it brings. The point, after forty years, is to dramatize and rever-
berate through time the oppression, and the freedom, felt by each and
every one of us, in whatever capacity we choose to conceive of
ourselves.
In every generation one must look upon himself as if he personally had come out
from Egypt ... 23
236. HAGGADAH, supra note 1, at 23.
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